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Abstract
Airfares fluctuate over time due to both demand shocks and intertemporal varia-
tion in willingness to pay. I develop and estimate a model of dynamic airline pricing
accounting for both forces with new flight-level data. With the model estimates, I dis-
entangle key interactions between the arrival pattern of consumer types and scarcity
of remaining capacity due to stochastic demand. I show that dynamic airline pricing
expands output by lowering fares charged to early-arriving, price-sensitive customers.
It also ensures seats for late-arriving travelers with the highest willingness to pay (e.g.
business travelers) who are then charged high prices. I find that dynamic airline pricing
increases total welfare relative to a more restrictive pricing regime. Finally, I show that
abstracting from stochastic demand results in incorrect inferences regarding the extent
to which airlines utilize intertemporal price discrimination.
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1 Introduction
Air Asia (2013) on intertemporal price discrimination:
Want cheap fares, book early. If you book your tickets late, chances are you are desperate to fly and therefore
don’t mind paying a little more.1
easyJet (2003) on dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand:
Our booking system continually reviews bookings for all future flights and tries to predict how popular
each flight is likely to be. If the rate at which seats are selling is higher than normal, then the price would
go up. This way we avoid the undesirable situation of selling out popular flights months in advance.2
The airline industry is well known for its complex intertemporal pricing dynamics.
Airfares close to the departure date are high. The conventional view is that late shoppers are
business travelers, and airlines capture their high willingness to pay through intertemporal
price discrimination. In addition, airlines also adjust prices on a day-to-day basis, as
capacity is limited and the demand for any given flight is uncertain. They may raise fares
to avoid selling out flights in advance, or fares may fall from one day to the next, after a
sequence of low demand realizations.
Decomposing the sources of price adjustments in airline markets is critical because they
lead to conflicting predictions for welfare. Price adjustments in response to realizations
of demand are welfare improving: they increase capacity utilization, and they save seats
for business travelers who shop close to the departure date. However, price adjustments
respond also to consumer preferences. Having saved seats for these price-insensitive
customers, airlines then extract their surplus through high prices. If these adjustments
were not possible, the prospect of extracting surplus from late-arriving customers can
create the incentive to save an inefficient number of seats and charge an inefficiently high
price. Thus, it is an empirical question whether dynamic airline pricing is on net welfare
increasing.
In this paper, I examine how dynamic pricing—pricing that depends on both demand
shocks and intertemporal variation in willingness to pay—allocates scarce capacity across
1Accessed through AirAsia.com’s Investor Relations page entitled, "What is low cost?"
2Appeared on easyjet.com’s FAQs. Accessed through "Low-Cost Carriers and Low Fares" and "Online
Marketing: A Customer-Led Approach."
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heterogeneous consumers in airline markets. I propose and estimate a model that com-
bines features of stochastic demand and revenue management models from operations
research with estimation techniques widely used in empirical economics research. I utilize
novel data that track daily prices and seat availabilities for over twelve thousand flights
in US monopoly markets. With the model estimates, I disentangle key interactions be-
tween the arrival pattern of consumer types and scarcity due to stochastic demand. I find
that dynamic pricing increases output by offering discounts to early-arriving, price sen-
sitive consumers, while also ensuring seat availability for late-arriving, price insensitive
consumers. I find that dynamic pricing increases welfare in the monopoly markets studied.
Existing research separately examines intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic
adjustment to stochastic demand in airline markets, and the central contribution of this
paper is to study them jointly and quantify their interactions. Consistent with the idea of
market segmentation, Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins (2015) use regression analysis and find
that ticket characteristics such as advance-purchase discount (APD) requirements explain
much of the dispersion in fares. Lazarev (2013) estimates a model of intertemporal price
discrimination and finds a substantial role for this force. Escobari (2012) and Alderighi,
Nicolini, and Piga (2015) find evidence that airlines face stochastic demand and that prices
respond to remaining capacity.
An investigation of dynamic airline pricing requires a detailed data set of flight-level
prices and transactions. However, the standard airline data sets used in economic studies
(e.g., Goolsbee and Syverson (2008); Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)) are either monthly or
quarterly. Papers have analyzed high-frequency fares—for example, McAfee and Te Velde
(2006), or a portion of transactions—for example, Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins (2015).
One of the contributions of this paper is a set of new stylized facts assembled from novel
fare (prices) and seat availability (quantities) data. The sample contains thousands of flights
in US monopoly markets, where each flight is tracked for up to sixty days. In total, the
sample contains over 700,000 observations.
Descriptive evidence provide new insights into the use of both pricing forces. I observe
both positive and negative price fluctuations. Fare increases occur after observed bookings.
Fares stay constant, or even decline, in the absence of sales. However, the trajectory of fares
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is overwhelmingly positive. Fares typically double in the sixty days before departure and,
regardless of sales, tend to sharply increase close to the departure date. This is consistent
with intertemporal price discrimination.
I develop a structural model to estimate both the unobserved arrival process of cus-
tomers and their preferences. I do so by combining features of dynamic pricing and
stochastic demand models commonly used in operations research, including Talluri and
Van Ryzin (2004) and Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Chaar (2010), with elements of the discrete
unobserved heterogeneity utility specification of Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006). Dis-
crete heterogeneity demand models are commonly used in airline studies—for example,
in Berry and Jia (2010). Although I tailor the model using institutional features of airline
markets, the methodology can be useful for analyzing any perishable goods market with a
deadline.
The model contains three key ingredients: (i) a monopolist has fixed capacity and
finite time to sell; (ii) the firm faces a stochastic arrival of consumers; and (iii) the mix of
consumers, corresponding to business and leisure travelers, is allowed to change over time.
The model timing is discrete. Each day before departure, the number of business and leisure
arrivals is distributed according to independent Poisson distributions with time-dependent
arrival rates. Consumers know their preferences and solve a static utility maximization
problem. On the supply side, the monopoly solves a finite-horizon, stochastic dynamic
programming problem. Within a period, the firm first chooses a price, consumer demand
is realized, and then the capacity constraint is updated. Time moves forward, and the
process repeats through the perishability date.
This paper proposes explicitly modeling the pricing decision of the firm to address
the well-known issue of missing "no purchase" data, or the number of arrivals who opted
not to purchase. The identification assumption is that preferences for flights evolve in the
same predictable way, but demand shocks can vary. This results in variation in seats sold
toward the deadline, and the firm’s response to these shocks informs the magnitude of
stochastic demand. The model estimates are market specific. They generally suggest that
a significant shift in arriving consumer types over time and that stochastic demand is a
meaningful driver of the variation in sales.
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The estimated model is used to establish two key points about the interaction between
the arrival pattern of consumer types and scarcity due to demand shocks. First, through
a series of counterfactuals, I decompose the relative importance of intertemporal price
discrimination and dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand. I show dynamic adjustment
complements intertemporal price discrimination in the airline industry because price-
insensitive consumers (i.e., business travelers) tend to buy tickets close to the departure
date. Dynamic pricing expands output by lowering fares offered to leisure travelers, but
it also ensures seat availability for business travelers who are then charged high prices.
Uniform pricing increases aggregate consumer surplus, however, the gains are mitigated
because it also results in additional unused capacity. I find that total welfare is higher under
dynamic pricing compared to more restrictive pricing regimes in the monopoly markets
studied.3
Second, I show that managing remaining capacity in airline markets is critical because
demand is stochastic and abstracting from its presence affects our understanding of how
airlines use intertemporal price discrimination. Over one third of the revenue gains of
dynamic pricing over uniform pricing come from the ability to respond to demand shocks.
The remaining two thirds come from the ability of the firm to extract surplus through
intertemporal price discrimination. According to the model, only 22 percent of the ob-
served flights are projected to be unaffected by scarcity in the initial period. Finally, I
show that the presence of stochastic demand and scarcity affects our understanding of
the use of intertemporal price discrimination. By abstracting from stochastic demand, the
opportunity cost of selling a seat is the same regardless of the date of purchase. In real-
ity, opportunity costs reflect demand shocks and the resolution of uncertainty toward the
perishability date. Therefore, it is difficult to identify intertemporal price discrimination
without knowing how firms respond to stochastic demand. Empirical procedures that ab-
stract from stochastic demand will systematically overstate consumers’ price insensitivity
because upward pressure on prices due to scarcity will be inferred as inelastic demand.
This bias becomes pronounced close to the departure date.
3The proposed model does not fit into existing theoretical work on the welfare effects of monopolistic price
discrimination, including Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) and Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015),
because capacity is constrained and the markets studied are sequential.
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1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to growing literatures in economics and operations research that
study intertemporal price discrimination and revenue management. Intertemporal price
discrimination can be found in many markets, including video games (Nair, 2007), Broad-
way theater (Leslie, 2004), storable goods (Hendel and Nevo, 2013), and concerts (Courty
and Pagliero, 2012).4 Contributions to the study of intertemporal price discrimination in
airline markets include Lazarev (2013) and Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins (2015).
Revenue management (RM) can refer to the dynamic adjustment of either product
availability or prices (and sometimes both).5 Several studies characterize optimal pric-
ing (either analytically or numerically) of RM models with Poisson arrivals (Gallego and
Van Ryzin, 1994; McAfee and Te Velde, 2006; Zhao and Zheng, 2000; Talluri and Van Ryzin,
2004; Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Chaar, 2010). Relative to these studies, this paper proposes
a model of both time-varying arrivals and multiple consumer types in discrete time. Dana
(1999) shows in a theoretical model that business consumers may benefit from RM.
The increasing trajectory of prices observed in airline markets reduces the incentives
for consumers to wait to buy, but existing research has shown strategic buyers to be an
important consideration. Theoretical contributions include Su (2007), Board and Skrzypacz
(2016), Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Strack (2018), and Dilmé and Li (2019). Hendel and
Nevo (2006) consider stockpiling and show that dynamic demand impact demand esti-
mates. In the context of major league baseball tickets, Sweeting (2012) estimates a model
of strategic delay with search costs. He finds that this leads buyers to sort on participation
timing, and he shows dynamic pricing is valuable in this context. Nair (2007) shows that
profit losses can be large when firms do not take into account forward-looking behavior.
This result is found in an environment where demand becomes more elastic over time;
Soysal and Krishnamurthi (2012) study markdowns and show that the incentives to wait
decrease because of stock-outs.
Finally, concurrent works provide new insights on the effects of dynamic pricing in
4Lambrecht et. al. (2012) provide an overview of empirical work on price discrimination more broadly.
5The former is commonly called quantity-based RM; the latter is commonly referred to as price-based RM.
Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) and Talluri and Van Ryzin (2005) provide an overview of RM work in
operations.
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various contexts. Cho et. al. (2018) quantify the gains from dynamic pricing in the
hotel industry. They also capture competitive pricing pressures. Chen (2018) examines
competitive dynamics in airlines. Aryal, Murry, and Williams (2018) utilize survey data
to examine dynamic pricing of different ticket qualities in international airline markets.
Finally, D’Haultfœuille et. al. (2018) quantify the effects of revenue management in the
French railway system. They also examine the role of demand uncertainty and show that
RM results in significant gains relative to uniform pricing.
2 Industry Description
In this section, I provide a short overview of airline pricing practices to motivate my
empirical approach. Interested readers can find additional details of revenue management
algorithms and practices in McGill and Van Ryzin (1999) and Gallego and Topaloglu (2019).
For a flight, observed prices over time depend on three key inputs: (1) plane capacity,
(2) filed fares, and (3) inventory allocation for filed fares. Input (2) means the prices for
flights, and input (3) corresponds to the number of seats the airline is willing to sell at
prices provided by (2). Each of these decisions is made by separate departments that use
different algorithms and methods to determine the most profitable decision, holding the
other departments’ choices fixed.
A carrier’s network-planning group determines which markets are served and the
total amount of capacity assigned to them. These decisions occur well in advance of the
departure date. Typically, flights are available for purchase over 300 days prior to the
departure date; however, adjustments can be made closer to the departure date. This
includes entry or exit decisions or a change in gauge of aircraft. In the data collected, I
observe that 2.5 percent of flights experience a change in aircraft in the sixty days before
departure. Capacity changes overwhelmingly occur close to the departure date: 75 percent
of occurrences happen within the two days before departure. Yet these changes do not
seem to be associated with flight loads.6 It is more likely that capacity changes close to the
6I cannot reject the null hypothesis that flights that see an upgauge (increase in capacity) have flight loads
higher than the average load factor for that particular flight number and vice versa. In the former case,
t = −0.996; in the latter case, t = 0.614. Note that these test statistics go in the opposite direction from what is
expected—flights that experience an upgauge actually have load factors slightly lower than the flight average;
6
departure date occur for operational reasons. I use this finding to motivate my choice to
abstract from capacity decisions and focus instead on pricing given remaining capacity.
The pricing department determines filed fares, or a set of fares and associated ticket
restrictions that may be offered to consumers. This includes prices of refundable and
non-refundable tickets, as well as first-class, economy-class, and basic-economy tickets. A
common ticket restriction applied to fares is an advance-purchase discount requirement, a
restriction that requires consumers to purchase by a certain day-before-departure. APDs are
commonly used three, seven, ten, fourteen, twenty-one, and thirty days before departure,
depending on the itinerary and carrier. A fare class (or booking class) is a single- or double-
letter code to denote broad ticket characteristics—deeply discounted economy versus full-
fare economy, for example. When the additional ticket restrictions are incorporated, this
results in a fare basis code.
Fare Basis Airline Fare Class Trip Type Fare Adv Purchase Req
LH4OASBN Alaska L One-Way $174.60 14
LH4OASMN Alaska L One-Way $189.60 14
QH4OASMN Alaska Q One-Way $217.60 14
YH0OASMR Alaska Y One-Way $334.00 −
In this example, there are two L fares filed, one saver economy fare and one economy
fare, each with a fourteen-day APD requirement. The two L fares have different fare
basis codes. The third fare is a fourteen-day APD Q-class fare. There is a fourth fare, an
unrestricted Y-class economy fare.
The pricing group creates a menu of fares for each market. This means the potential
number of fares for a particular itinerary is discrete. However, the set may change over
time if the pricing department files updated fares. I incorporate this feature in the empirical
model by having the firm choose among a discrete set of fares.
Finally, the revenue management department determines fare availability. This process
involves setting the number of seats available for purchase for each fare class. In order to
dynamically adjust the allocations of fares based on bookings and updated forecasts, the
RM department formulates complicated dynamic programming problems and uses tech-
niques developed in operations research, including the well-known ESMR-a and ESMR-b
flights that experience a downgauge have a load factor slightly higher than the flight average.
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heuristics (Belobaba, 1987, 1989, 1992; Belobaba and Weatherford, 1996), in order to make
them tractable. Phillips (2005) provides an overview of these approaches. Importantly, the
allocation decision takes potential fares and forecasts as inputs. Allocations are updated
toward the perishability date based on demand realizations. My model of the firm also
takes the forecasts and fares as inputs; optimization is assumed to occur daily.
RM systems are designed such that several fares are available at any given point in time.
Continuing the example above, airlines would surely be willing to sell all available seats
as expensive Y-class fares, but chances are few consumers would purchase at the highest
of prices. As a consequence, airlines offer less-expensive fares under different fare classes
such as L and Q. An allocation for a at flight a particular point in time may be (Y:10, Q: 2, L:
1). If a consumer purchases the lowest available class (L), the allocation will likely become
(Y:9, Q: 1, L: 0), absent inputs from the pricing group or reoptimization by the RM group.
The lowest available fare will then become a Q-class ticket.7
Combining the decisions of the pricing group and revenue management, this implies
that airline prices depend not only on ticket restrictions such as APDs but also on the
current seat allocation of each flight, which depends on demand realizations. The data
reveal that both restrictions and bookings influence fares—flights with bookings today
tend to become more expensive, whereas flights without daily bookings tend to see prices
either stay the same or decrease.
Without access to individual-level purchase data and inventory allocations over time
(these data are proprietary and available data are top coded, as described in the next
section), I do not pursue modeling inventory allocation. Instead, I simplify the problem
into a dynamic pricing problem under a number of assumptions, including that consumers
purchase only the cheapest available fare. I observe that daily demands for flights are
low—less than one seat per flight per day. I argue that this finding removes the need to
model the nesting structure of fare buckets, as in the example above.
7See Phillips (2005) for additional information on this approach, which is called nesting.
8
3 Data
I create several original data sets for this study. The data are collected from travel man-
agement companies, travel meta-search engines, and airline websites.8 I collect and merge
together three pieces of information.
First, I collect daily prices at the itinerary level, with itinerary defined as an origin-
destination, airline, flight number, and departure-date combination. I focus on one-way
fares, as for almost all of the sample, round-trip prices are equal to the sum of segment
prices. Most analysis concentrates on the cheapest available economy-class ticket for
purchase. Whenever possible, I also collect prices for different versions of tickets, such as
economy versus first class and restricted economy versus unrestricted economy.
Second, I collect fare class availability information. These data record censored fare
class allocations for each flight. For example, on a date prior to departure, I may observe
G5. This means the active G-class fare has five available seats. The information is censored
in that availabilities are top coded, typically at seven or nine, depending on the carrier. As
another example, Y9 means the Y-class fare—almost always the most expensive coach fare
available—has at least nine seats available. I utilize this information to confirm when flights
are sold out. Whenever possible, I also collect filed fare restrictions. These data record any
advance-purchase discount requirements or other restrictions on the ticket. Continuing the
previous example, a filed fare in the data is G21JN5. This G-class fare includes a twenty-
one-day advance-purchase requirement. The proposed model accommodates the use of
APDs.
Third, I collect airline seat maps, which are graphical representations of available and
occupied seats flights. By collecting airline seat maps over time and tracking changes to
individual seats across consecutive days, I obtain a measure of daily bookings. These data
provide quantity information. In Appendix C, I provide evidence two ways that suggests
the measurement error associated with using seat maps may be small.
8More specifically, the data come from Alaska Airlines, BCD Travel, ExpertFlyer, Fare Compare, JetBlue
Airways, United Airlines, and Yapta. The airline websites provide a wealth of information, including seat
availabilities, seat maps and fares. ExpertFlyer reports filed fares, seat availabilities, and seat maps; BCD
Travel reports seat availabilities; Fare Compare reports filed fares, and Yapta tracks daily fares. Data were
collected in 2012 and again in 2019.
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In the following subsections, I discuss route selection (Section 3.1) and then document
a set of new descriptive facts (Section 3.2).
3.1 Route Selection
Using the publicly available DB1B tables, I select markets in which to study. These data are
frequently used to study airline markets. The DB1B tables contain a 10-percent sample of
domestic US ticket purchases. The data are at the quarterly level. The data contain neither
the date flown nor the purchase date, hence the need to collect data for this study. I define
a market in the DB1B as an origin-destination (OD), quarter. With the DB1B data, I single
out markets where
(i) there is only one carrier operating nonstop;
(ii) there is no nearby alternative airport serving the same destination;
(iii) total quarterly traffic is greater than 600 passengers;
(iv) total quarterly traffic is less than 45,000 passengers;
(v) a significant portion of traffic is nonstop;
(vi) a significant portion of traffic is not connecting.
Criteria (i) and (ii) narrow the focus to monopoly markets in terms of nonstop flight
options. Criteria (iii) and (iv) remove infrequently served markets, and the upper limit on
traffic keeps data collection manageable. When I implement these criteria, the resulting
markets make up roughly 10 percent of OD traffic in the United States. In addition, quar-
terly revenues for these markets are roughly $2.5 billion. Criterion (v) is important because
it addresses the potential for alternative flight options, such as one-stop connections. Cri-
terion (vi) is equally important because it addresses how fares are assigned to observed
changes in remaining capacity.
Criteria (v) and (vi) are negatively correlated, meaning routes with high nonstop traffic
percentages typically have low percentages of non-connecting traffic. This is because ODs
with very high nonstop traffic percentages tend to be short-distance flights to hubs, after
which consumers connect to other flights. Without individual-level data, it is impossible
to know the itinerary purchased for each observed booking. Moreover, given that ODs
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with the highest concentration of nonstop traffic are more than twice as short—comparing
above the 95th percentile with below the 95th percentile—it is also possible that alternative
modes of transportation, such as taking a bus or train, are valid substitutes to flying.
I collect data on fifty OD pairs that satisfy the selection criteria above. In addition, to
compare the descriptive evidence, I select six duopoly markets (Section 3.2).9 Appendix B
presents additional route selection information, market-level statistics, and comparisons
with the entire DB1B sample.
All of the routes studied either originate or end at Boston, MA; Portland, OR; or Seattle,
WA. Almost all of the data collected study markets operated by either Alaska or JetBlue.
Several features of the sample are worth noting. First, both of these carriers price itineraries
at the segment level; that is, consumers wishing to purchase round-trip tickets on this carrier
purchase two one-way tickets. As a consequence, round-trip fares in these markets are
exactly equal to the sum of the corresponding one-way fares. I observe no length-of-stay
requirements or Saturday-night stay-overs. Since fares must be attributed to each seat map
change, this feature of the data makes it easier to justify the fare involved.
Second, JetBlue does not oversell flights.10 I will use this feature of the data to simplify
the pricing problem presented in the next section. Third, several of the markets studied
feature coach-only flights. This feature allows for investigating all sales and also controls
for one aspect of versioning (first class versus economy class). Finally, the sample focuses
on airlines that allow consumers to select seats before departure; many carriers now charge
fees to choose seats when traveling on restrictive coach tickets.11
In contrast with Jetblue, Alaska does offer first class in several of the markets studied—
first class appears in 58 percent of the sample, with the average cabin being twelve seats
of the plane. I provide some descriptive analysis of first-class pricing, but I do not pursue
9Two markets, (Boston, MA - Kansas City, MO) and (Boston, MA - Seattle, WA) are both. The former
market originally had nonstop service offered by Delta Air Lines and Frontier Airlines. Frontier exited and
Delta became the only carrier flying nonstop. The latter market very briefly was observed to have service
offered solely by Alaska prior to the entry of JetBlue.
10In the legal section of the JetBlue website, under "Passenger Service Plan": "JetBlue does not overbook
flights. However some situations, such as flight cancellations and reaccommodation, might create a similar
situation."
11The JetBlue data were collected before the introduction of Blue Basic seats, which feature a fee to select
seats. This is also true for Delta Air Lines. Alaska Airlines’ restrictive coach tickets are called Saver fares.
These fares do allow for limited seat selection in the coach cabin. I observe availability of these seats in 98
percent of seat maps.
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versioning in the model. Alaska does allow for overselling, but I note that among the major
airlines, Alaska Airlines has an average denied boarding rate.12
3.2 Descriptive Evidence
3.2.1 Summary Statistics
I capture fares and seat availabilities for over 12,000 flights, each tracked for the last sixty
days before departure. Data collection occurred over two six-month periods (March 2012-
August 2012, March 2019-August 2019). In total, I obtain 734,689 observations for analysis,
as well as over five million connecting itinerary prices.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Data Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median 5th pctile 95th pctile
Oneway Fare ($) 233.95 139.72 194.00 89.00 504.00
Load Factor (%) 86.95 13.32 91.33 59.21 100.00
Daily Fare Change ($) 3.32 31.94 0.00 -5.00 50.00
Daily Booking Rate 0.73 1.96 0.00 0.00 4.00
Unique Fares (per itin.) 6.98 2.31 7.00 4.00 11.00
Note: Summary statistics for 12,052 flights tracked between 3/2/2012-8/24/2012 and 3/21/2019-
8/31/2019. Each flight is tracked for sixty days before departure. The total number of observations
is 734,689. Load Factor is reported between zero and 100 the day of departure. The daily booking
rate and daily fare change compares consecutive days.
Summary statistics for the data sample appear in Table 1. The average one-way ticket
in the sample is $234. This is higher than the average price calculated from the publicly
available DB1B tables (Table 12); however, recall that these gathered prices cover the sixty
days before departure and also include non-transacted prices.
Reported load factor is the number of occupied seats divided by capacity on the day
flights leave and is reported between zero and one hundred. In my sample, the average
load factor is 87 percent, ranging from 69 percent to 94 percent, by market. I observe that
9 percent of flights sell out. The median number of daily departures is one and the mean
is two.
12Source: Air Travel Consumer Report, accessed February 2020.
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There is considerable variation in load factor within a market: this supports the presence
of flight-level demand shocks. The coefficient of variation (CV) of within-market load
factors ranges between 0.04 and 0.27. CVs are higher well in advance of the departure date;
the reduction over time is consistent with price adjustments to fill unsold seats. The R2 of a
regression of ending load factor on market-flight number and departure date (subsuming
seasonality and day-of-week indicators) fixed effects is only 0.5. This motivates the use of
a stochastic demand model of flight-level demand.
The booking rate in Table 1 corresponds to the mean difference in occupied seats across
consecutive days. I find the average booking rate to be 0.73 seats per flight-day. At the
5th percentile, zero seats per flight are booked a day, and at the 95th percentile, four seats
per flight are booked a day. This finding shows that airline markets are associated with
low daily demand. Fifty-nine percent of the seat maps in the sample do not change across
consecutive days. This requires the demand estimation technique to confront the fact that
there is a significant number of zero sales.
On average, each itinerary reaches seven unique fares and experiences 10.6 fare changes.
This implies that fares fluctuate up and down usually a few times within sixty days. Since
the number of fares chosen is small, I will use this institutional feature in the model. Fares
will be chosen from a discrete set.
I use data on individual seat assignments in order to gauge the number of passengers
per booking—the idea being that adjacent seats becoming occupied likely constitutes a
party traveling together.13 I estimate the average number of passengers per booking to be
1.37. This motivates the unit demand assumption in the consumer demand model.
3.2.2 Dynamic Prices
Figure 1 shows the frequency and magnitude of fare changes across time. The top panel
indicates the fraction of itineraries that experience fare hikes versus fare discounts by day
13Each row in the data has at most six seats, and I assume whenever more than two seats in row become
occupied, this is a party traveling together. This occurs in less than 8 percent of bookings. For rows in which
two seats become occupied, I check if the seats are adjacent. Seats with passengers or space in-between are
assumed to be two single-passenger bookings. This removes 18 percent of the two-passenger bookings. Thus,
as a potential lower bound, I find that 55 percent of passengers, or 75 percent of bookings, are single passenger
bookings.
13
Figure 1: Frequency and Magnitude of Fare Changes by Day Before Departure




























Note: The top panel shows the percentage of itineraries that see fares increase or decrease by day before departure. The
lower panel plots the magnitude of the fare declines and increases by day before departure. The vertical lines correspond to
advance-purchase discount periods (fare fences).
before departure, and the bottom panel indicates the magnitude of these fare changes (i.e.,
a plot of first differences, conditional on the direction of the fare change). For example, in
the top plot, forty days prior to departure (t=20), roughly 5 percent of fares increase and 5
percent of fares decrease. The remaining 90 percent of fares are held constant. Moving to
the bottom panel, the magnitude of fare increases and declines forty days out is roughly
$50. The top panel confirms fares hikes and declines occur throughout time. Note that
well before the departure date, the number of fare hikes and the number of fare declines
are roughly even.
There are three noticeable jumps in the top panel in Figure 1, indicating fare hikes. These
jumps occur seven, fourteen, and twenty-one days before departure, or when the advance-
purchase discounts placed on many tickets expire. A few of the markets experience APD
restrictions three days before departure.14 The use of APDs is consistent with the use of
intertemporal price discrimination. Surprisingly, the use of APDs is not universal. Just
under 50 percent of itineraries experience fare hikes at twenty-one days, and just over 50
percent increase at fourteen days. Nearly 60 percent of itineraries see an increase in fares
when crossing the seven-day APD requirement.
14Advance purchase discounts are sometimes placed one, four, ten, thirty, and sixty days before departure,
but this is not the case for the data I collect.
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Figure 2: Mean Fare and Load Factor by Day Before Departure































Note: Average fare and load factor by day before departure. The vertical lines correspond to advance-purchase discount
periods (fare fences).
Figure 2 plots the mean fare and mean load factor (seats occupied/capacity) by day
before departure. The plot confirms that the overall trend in prices is positive, with fares
increasing from roughly $200 to over $400 in sixty days. The noticeable jumps in the fare
time series occur when crossing the APD fences noted in Figure 1. At sixty days before
departure, roughly 40 percent of seats are already occupied. The booking curve for flights
in the sample is smooth across time and starts to level off around 80 percent a few days
before departure. There is a spike in load factor, of around 5 percent the day of departure.
This spike could be driven by a combination of measurement error (consumers who were
not assigned seats in advance are assigned seats at check-in) and last-minute bookings. I
show in Appendix D that on the last day before departure, there is also a sharp decline in
economy inventory, which indicates that last-minute bookings do occur.15
There is considerable variation in pricing across markets not shown in the aggregate
statistic shown in Figure 2. Figure 11 and Figure 12 in Appendix A plot average prices
over time as well as the average percent change in prices over time for each market. Levels
of fares, the timing of APDs, and the significance of APDs vary by market. These figures
suggest the need to include market-specific parameters.
15Three markets (Lihue, HI - Portland, OR; Palm Springs, CA - Portland, OR; Santa Barbara, CA - Seattle,
WA) are observed to have large seat map changes at the deadline even though the seat maps allow for seat
selection regardless of ticket type in over 99 percent of observations. It may be that these spikes represent
group bookings or bookings with travel agencies that do not assign seats until check in. For these markets, I
assume the spikes reflect bookings made before the collection period as the timing of purchase is not observed.
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Figure 3: Fare Response to Sales by Day Before Departure
















Note: Average fare changes as a response to sales by day before departure. The vertical lines correspond to advance-purchase
discount periods (fare fences). The horizontal line indicates no fare response.
Figure 3 establishes a new important link between daily sales and daily price adjust-
ments. The graph separates out two scenarios: (1) a flight experiences positive sales in
the previous period; and (2) there are no sales in the previous period. Critically, the graph
demonstrates that fares respond to both scarcity and time. It suggests an important inter-
action between the presence of demand shocks and intertemporal variation in willingness
to pay. Conditional on positive sales, capacity becomes more scarce, and prices increase. I
find that prices stay constant or decrease when sales do not occur, reflecting the declining
opportunity cost of capacity. Both of these price movements are consistent with stochastic
demand pricing models. However, close to the departure date and regardless of sales,
prices increase. This suggests late-arriving consumers are less price-sensitive and airlines
capture their high willingness to pay with intertemporal price discrimination.16
These pricing patterns are not limited to economy tickets in monopoly airline markets.
In Appendix D, I show that competitive airline markets exhibit similar pricing patterns:
fares adjust upward or downward depending on bookings and fares adjust upward re-
gardless of bookings close to the departure date. These patterns are also shown to exist
when a carrier offers different ticket qualities, such as first class and economy class. Hence,
Two of these markets also have irregular service.
16This was originally pointed out by McAfee and Te Velde (2006). Although, stochastic demand models can
result in increasing price paths, they argue that the magnitude of observed price hikes suggest later arrivals
are less price sensitive.
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the modeling approach and results found in this paper are relevant for these important
extensions.17
Finally, although fares do occasionally decline, the trajectory is overwhelmingly pos-
itive. This greatly reduces the incentive to wait to purchase, conditional on knowing
preferences. We may be concerned that consumers strategically time their purchases in
order to avoid fare hikes. In Appendix E, I investigate bunching in bookings. Most of the
evidence suggests that this is not a concern. Bookings slightly decline (0.08 seats per day)
the day after the 7-day APD expires. However, the the booking rate then returns to the
same level the following day, when prices are just as high. This motivates Poisson demand.
4 An Empirical Model of Dynamic Airline Pricing
4.1 Model Overview
A monopolist airline offers a flight for sale in a series of sequential markets. More precisely,
I will define the markets for a flight on a particular departure date, and I will abstract away
from potential correlations in demands across departure dates and other flight options,
including connecting flights and other nonstop itineraries. The sales process for every
market evolves over a finite and discrete time horizon t ∈ {0, . . . ,T}. Period 0 corresponds
to the first sales period, and period T corresponds to the day the flight leaves. Initial
capacity for the flight is exogenous, and the firm is not allowed to oversell. Unsold
capacity on the day of the flight (t = T) is scraped with zero value. The only costs modeled
are the opportunity costs of remaining capacity, and all other costs are normalized to zero.
Each period t, the airline first offers a single price for the flight, and then consumers
arrive according to a stochastic process specified in the next subsection. Each arriving
consumer is either a business traveler or a leisure traveler; business travelers are less price
sensitive than leisure travelers, and the proportion of each type is allowed to change over
time. Note that the terms "business" and "leisure" are used simply to describe a consumer
17In Appendix D, I also investigate if demand shocks affect prices of alternative flights, including connections
and other nonstop flights when a carrier offers more than a single daily frequency. I present evidence that
nonstop bookings do not affect connecting prices in the same way as nonstop prices. If a carrier offers two
flights per day, a booking on one flight does not increase the price of the other flight option.
17
type; they do not identify consumers based on a travel need.18 Upon entering the market,
all uncertainty about travel preferences is resolved. This approach differs from earlier
theoretical work such as Gale and Holmes (1993), as well as some empirical work such
as Lazarev (2013), in which existing consumer uncertainty can be resolved by delaying
purchase. In this model, at date t, consumers arrive and choose to either purchase a ticket
or exit the market.
If demand exceeds remaining capacity, tickets are randomly rationed. Consumers who
are not selected receive the outside option. This ensures that the capacity constraint is not
violated. I also assume that passengers do not cancel tickets, as the average number of can-
cellations per flight in the data is less than two. Thus, remaining capacity is monotonically
decreasing. After tickets are sold in a given period, the capacity constraint is updated, and
the firm again chooses a fare to offer. This process repeats until the perishability date. The
firm is forward looking and solves the finite horizon, dynamic program.
4.2 Demand
Each day before the flight leaves, t = 0, 1, ...,T, a stochastic process brings a discrete number
of new consumers to the market. M̃t denotes the arrival draw. The demand model is based
on the two-consumer type discrete choice model of Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), which
is frequently applied to airline data. Consumer i is a business traveler with probability γt
or a leisure traveler with probability 1−γt. Consumer i has preferences (βi, αi) over product
characteristics (x jt ∈ RK) and price (p jt > 0), respectively.
I assume utility is linear in product characteristics and price. If consumer i chooses to
purchase a ticket on flight j, she receives utility ui jt = x jtβi−αip jt + εi jt. If she chooses not to
fly, she receives normalized utility ui0t = εi0t. Arriving consumers solve a straightforward
maximization problem: consumer i selects flight j if and only if ui jt ≥ ui0t.
Define yt =
(
αi, βi, εi jt, εi0t
)
i∈1,..,M̃t
to be the vector of preferences for the consumers who
enter the market. Suppressing the notation on product characteristics for the rest of this
18Booking websites and surveys oftentimes ask the reason for travel. Typically, the two options are for
business or for leisure. The model estimates two consumer types that need not coincide with these two
rationales for travel.
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section, demand for flight j at t is defined as





ui jt ≥ ui0t
]
∈ {0, ..., M̃t},
where 1(·) denotes the indicator function. Demand is integer valued; however, it may be
the case that there are more consumers who want to travel than there are seats remaining.
That is, Q jt(p, y) > c jt, where c jt is the number of seats remaining at t. Since the firm is
not allowed to oversell, in these instances, I assume that remaining capacity is rationed by
random selection. Specifically, I assume that the market first allows consumers to enter
and choose to fly or not. After consumers make their decisions, the capacity constraint is
checked. If demand exceeds remaining capacity for the flight, consumers who chose to
travel are randomly shuffled. The first c jt are selected, and the rest receive their outside
options. Although this is a restrictive assumption, recall that the average number of seats
sold per flight day is less than one.
By abstracting from the ability to oversell and incorporating the rationing rule, expected






Q jt(p, yt), c
)
dFt(yt).
Before continuing, note that although the model assumes that consumers arrive and
purchase a single one-way ticket, it allows for round-trip ticket purchases in the following
way. A consumer arrives looking to travel, leaving on date d and returning on date d′. The
consumer receives idiosyncratic preference shocks for each of the available flights in both
directions and chooses which tickets to purchase. Since several airlines such as Alaska and
JetBlue price at the segment level, there is no measurement error in this procedure. That is,
a consumer pays the same price for two one-way tickets as he or she would for a round-trip
ticket.
I incorporate a number of parametric assumptions. First, following McFadden (1973), I
assume that the idiosyncratic preferences of consumers are independently and identically
distributed according to a Type-1 Extreme Value (T1EV) distribution. This assumption
19






exp(x jtβi − αip jt)
1 + exp(x jtβi − αip jt)
.
Let B denote the business type and L denote the leisure type. Recall that the probability of
a consumer being type B is γt. Then, γtπBjt defines the purchase probability that a consumer
is of the business type and wants to purchase a ticket; (1−γt)πLjt is similarly defined. Hence,
















Next, I assume that consumers arrive according to a Poisson process, M̃t ∼ Poissont(µt).
The arrival rates, µt, are also allowed to change over time. Hence, daily demands will
depend on both the arrival process as well as preferences of consumers entering the market.
Conditional on price, Q jt ∼ Poissont(µtπ jt). The probability that q seats are demanded on
flight j at time t are equal to
Prt
(












Finally, using the probability distribution on the number of seats demanded, expected
demand can be written as19






































19This is can be equivalently written as
























because the probability of at least c jt seats being demanded is equivalent to one minus the probability that
fewer than c jt seats are demanded.
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4.3 Monopoly Pricing Problem
The monopolist maximizes expected revenues of the flight over a series of sequential
markets. In each market, the firm chooses to offer a single price before the arrival of
customers. Because of the institutional feature that airfares are discrete, I assume that the
firm chooses prices from a discrete set, denoted A(t). The set changes over time because of
fare restrictions such as advance-purchase discount requirements.20
The pricing decision is based on the states of the flight: seats remaining; time left to sell;
flight characteristics (notation suppressed); and idiosyncratic shocks ωt ∈ RA(t), which are
assumed to be independently and identically distributed following a Type-1 Extreme Value
(T1EV) distribution, with scale parameter σ. These shocks are assumed to be additively
separable to the remainder of the per-period payoff function, which are expected revenues
(suppressing index j),
Ret(pt; ct) = pt ·Q
e
t(pt; ct).
The firm’s problem can be written as a dynamic discrete choice model. Let Vt(ct, ωt) be
the value function given the state (t, ct, ωt). Denoting δ as the discount factor, the dynamic
program (DP) of the firm is
Vt(ct, ωt) = max
p∈A(t)
(
Ret(p; ct) + ωtp + δ
∫
ωt+1,ct+1 | ct,ωt,p
Vt+1(ct+1, ωt+1)dHt(ωt+1, ct+1 |ωt, p, ct)
)
.




, where Qt is
the realized demand draw. The firm faces two boundary conditions. The first is that once
the airline hits the capacity constraint, it can no longer sell seats for that flight. The second
is that unsold seats are scrapped with zero value.
I follow Rust (1987) and assume that conditional independence is satisfied. This means
that the transition probabilities are equal to ht(ωt+1, ct+1 |ωt, pt, ct) = g(ωt+1) ft(ct+1 | pt, ct).
20In principle, the model can be extended to an environment where the monopolist offers multiple flights (J).
Two assumptions that can be used so that the model closely follows the exposition here are: (1) consumers do
not know remaining capacities when solving the utility maximization problem, (2) when capacity is rationed,
consumers not selected receive the outside option. The first assumption addresses that consumers may select
less preferred options if the probability of getting a seat is higher. The second assumption implies that
conditional on price, Q jt is independent of Q j′t for j′ , j and that Q jt ∼ Poissont(µtπ jt). The complexity of the
dynamic program increases by dim[A(·)](J−1) relative to the complexity of the single-flight problem.
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The capacity transitions ft(·) can be derived from the probability distribution of sales
described in the previous section. I return to this momentarily.
By assuming the unobservable is distributed T1EV, along with conditional indepen-








(Ret+1(ct+1, pt+1) + EVt+1(pt+1, ct+1)
σ
)
 ft(ct+1|ct, pt) + σφ,




















Before continuing, I discuss the connections between the notation Prt
(
Q jt = q ; p jt
)
,
which denotes probability masses of sales, and ft(ct+1 | ct, pt), above, which denotes capacity
transition probabilities. Consider a two-period model with a single seat. In the first period,
expected revenues are formed based on Prt
(
Q jt = q ; p jt
)
. In this case, expected revenues
are simply Pr1
(
Q1 ≥ 1 ; p1
)
· 1 · p1 because the probability that zero seats are demanded
is associated with zero revenues, and with constrained capacity, at most one seat can be
sold. The demand probabilities exactly inform the capacity transition probabilities under
conditional independence:








Q1 = 0 ; p1
) ]
.
That is, with probability Pr1
(
Q1 ≥ 1 ; p1
)
, the seat sells today and nothing is available
for sale tomorrow. On the other hand, with probability Pr1
(
Q1 = 0 ; p1
)
, the seat is not
sold today and is available for purchase tomorrow. The optimal price that affects these
probabilities depends on three key inputs: the uncertainty in demand, the share of each
consumer type, and the preferences of consumers. Time is a deterministic state. In the
general model, with a longer time horizon and additional capacity, many entries in the
transition probability matrix are equal to zero. In particular, any entry associated with a
probability that ct+1 > ct is equal to zero because capacity is monotonically decreasing.
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CCPt(ct, pt) ft(ct+1|ct, pt), (4.1)
where θ :=
(
β, α, γt, µt, σ
)
are the parameters to be estimated. In the next section, I place
additional restrictions on the parameters γt and µt.
5 Model Estimates
In this section, I discuss the identification and the estimation procedure (Section 5.1),
model estimates (in Section 5.2), and provide a discussion of model fit and predictions (in
Section 5.3).
5.1 Identification and Estimation
The key identification challenge of the paper is to separately identify the demand parame-
ters from the arrival process. This challenge is pointed out in Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004),
for example. The issue arises because without search data to pin down the arrival process,
an increase in arrivals could be seen instead as a change in the mix of consumer types
(demand). For example, the sale of two seats could have occurred because two consumers
arrived and both purchased, or because four consumers arrived and half purchased. This
is sometimes called the lack of "no purchase" data. Consumer search data can be used to
solve this issue. Unfortunately, these data cannot be collected from public sources.
This paper proposes incorporating the supply-side model in order to separately identify
the demand parameters and the arrival process. In particular, I assume that firms optimally
price given seats remaining, time left to sell, and their unobservables. Preferences are
assumed to evolve in the same predictable way, but demand shocks can vary for each
flight toward the deadline. This results in variation in seats sold over time, and the firm’s
response to these shocks informs the magnitude of stochastic demand. That is, by solving
the firm’s problem, I recover the opportunity cost of capacity, and along with the pricing
decision, I back out the overall demand elasticity. By tracing out price adjustments from
variation in seats remaining given time to sell and variation over time given a constant
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capacity constraint, I separate the incentives to adjust prices in response to demand shocks
versus the demand elasticity.
Figure 3 provides graphical evidence of the identification argument. Given stochastic
demand, we would expect prices to rise when demand exceeds expectations and fall after
a sequence of low demand realizations. This is shown in the figure as the solid (blue) line
is above the zero, and the dashed (black) line is at or below zero. However, Figure 3 shows
that prices sharply rise close to the departure date and regardless of sales. This sharp rise
in prices regardless of the scarcity of seats suggests a change in consumer arrivals over
time. That is, consumers who shop late are less price sensitive than those who shop early.
I assign the discount factor to be one. In addition, I place restrictions on γt and µt, or
the probability on consumer types and Poisson arrival rates, respectively. I assign
µ1 Greater than twenty-one days before departure (21+);
µ2 Fourteen to twenty-one days before departure (20-14);
µ3 Seven to fourteen days before departure (13-7); and
µ4 Within seven days before departure (6-0),
which corresponds to the advance-purchase discount periods commonly seen in airline
markets. This adds some flexibility in the Poisson arrivals of customers. In addition, I
assign
Prt(Business) = γt =
exp
(




γ0 + γ1t + γ2t2
) ,∀t = 0, ...,T.
This parametric specification allows for non-monotonicity in consumer types over time,
while keeping the function bounded between zero and one.
I utilize a dynamic discrete choice model because fares are chosen from a pre-determined
set—as discussed in Section 2, fares are assigned by the pricing department. The supply
model can be interpreted as modeling the decisions of revenue management, conditional
on the choices made by other airline departments. In particular, the model takes the
initial capacity and observed fares as given. Given the set of fares, identification assumes
the pricing choice is optimal. This is perhaps not unreasonable given the sophisticated
pricing models used by airlines (McGill and Van Ryzin, 1999). However, airlines operate
complex networks and the pricing decision for a single flight may be impacted by forces not
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accounted for in the model—for example, a persistent, unobserved shock to the network
could overstate the role of capacity in the model.
The average number of unique fares observed per flight is less than seven; however,
I observe adjustments, sometimes by a single dollar, to fares over time.21 To account for
this without increasing the dimensionality of the problem, I cluster prices using k-means
and then take the cluster centers to define prices for each market. I select the minimum
in-sample fit threshold of 98.5 percent, which results in choice sets that range from size
five to eleven. To preserve to use of APDs, I then assign day-before-departure-specific
choice sets based on when the clustered prices appear in the data. That is, the procedure
captures the advance-purchase discounts observed in the data, albeit with clustered fares.
This approach allows me to utilize the full structure of the model for estimation.22
I maximize the log-likelihood of the firm’s dynamic programming problem found in
Equation 4.1 separately for each market. I group together the directional traffic of the city
pairs, which means demand does not vary by direction. Appendix B shows that directional
prices are very similar. I do not estimate demand for markets with nonstop competition.
For any candidate solution vector θ, I calculate the Poisson demand functions, expected
revenues, and transition probabilities. The firm’s problem is finite horizon; thus, with those
objects calculated, I solve for the value functions using the recursive structure of the firm’s
problem. Backward induction allows for computing the conditional choice probabilities
(CCP) for any state of the dynamic program. With the transition probabilities and CCPs
defined, I calculate the log likelihood given a candidate solution vector θ. I maximize the
objective, log (L(data|θ)) .23
21One way to incorporate these pricing adjustments is to assume they are known in advance, but doing
so greatly increases the complexity of the problem since it requires specifying many dynamic programs
(partitioning flights by the unique set of filed fares observed for each departure date).
22Other approaches are available. In the hotel setting, Cho et. al. (2018) find the set of prices to be large and
they propose using generalized method of moments (GMM) with moment conditions from both the demand
and supply side.
23Estimation utilizes the interior/direct algorithm using the solver Knitro. The algorithm uses parallel multi-
start, selecting at least 100 random initial starting values over a wide set. Using up to sixty-four threads,
estimation for a single market takes as few as two hours and at most two days.
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5.2 Parameter Estimates
Parameter estimates appear in three tables, Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8, located in Appendix
A.24 Each table contains estimates for eight markets and each table has three subsections.
The first subsection, "Logit Demand," reports consumer preference estimates as well
as parameters governing the probability on consumer types over time (γt). Consumer
preferences are all found to be statistically significant at conventional levels, except for the
intercept for the (Palm Springs, CA; Portland, OR) city pair. The parameter estimates sug-
gest that, on average, leisure consumers are twice as price sensitive as business consumers,
and business consumers are willing to pay over 68 percent more in order to secure a seat.25
The parameters on the probability of consumer types (γt) are not easily interpretable
so I plot aspects of their distributions below (Figure 4, left panel). The plots depict the
average (across markets) business share over time, as well as the interquartile range and
the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles. Most markets exhibit increasing γt processes over
time; 10 percent of early arrivals are the type labeled "business" and close to 80 percent of
late arrivals are the type labeled "business." In early periods, prices are relatively flat and I
estimate the average γt to be flat. Starting at twenty-one days before departure, I estimate a
significant change in the business customer share. This corresponds with the time at which
fares start raising rapidly.
Figure 13 in Appendix A plots the fitted values for γt for each market separately. The
heterogeneity in the arrival estimates is expected given the differences in pricing dynamics
across markets (see Figure 11 and Figure 12). I estimate that markets such as (Lihue, HI -
Portland, OR) and (Palm Springs, CA - Portland, OR) have mostly flat or non-monotonic
γt processes. Presumably these markets cater heavily to leisure customers. The Hawaii
process decreases in early periods; average fares slightly decrease well in advance of the
deadline. Two markets are estimated as having nearly linear γt processes; they are (Seattle,
WA - Wichita, KS) and (Oklahoma City, OK - Seattle, WA). These markets tend to have
24I do not estimate demand for markets that were observed to have more than one nonstop carrier during
the data collection period. The excluded markets are: Boston, MA - Kansas City, MO; Boston, MA - Seattle,
WA; Boston, MA - Portland, OR; Seattle, WA - Sacramento, CA. Service to/from Lihue, HI and Palm Springs,
CA were less than once daily. Estimation uses flights tracked for at least thirty periods.
25The mean ratio of price sensitivity is 2.57; the median is 2.31.
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Figure 4: Visualizing the Arrival Process over Time
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25th-75th Percentiles
5th-95th Percentiles















Mean Arrivals over Markets
25th-75th Percentiles
5th-95th Percentiles
Note: Fitted values of the arrival process of business versus leisure customers across the booking horizon. In the left figure,
the y-axis is Pr(business), so 1 − Prt(Business) defines Prt(Leisure). In the right figure, the levels of the arrival process are
plotted over time.
smaller price increases (in percentage terms), as shown in Figure 12. The first two rows in
the table show the general trend: the share of early business arrivals is typically between 0
and 20 percent and the share increases to 60 to 100 percent the day of departure. The shape
of the curves correlates with the use of APDs: a larger price increase at the twenty-day
APD generally creates a steeper profile. Overall, the estimates establish that a meaningful
shift occurs in willingness to pay over time. Average demand elasticities range from 1.5 to
6.3, depending on market and time until departure.
The parametric assumption on consumer types is flexible, as it captures S-shape, almost
linear, and non-monotonic arrival paths. However, the model can be restrictive. Two
markets, (Helena, MT - Seattle, WA) and (Seattle, WA - Sun Valley, ID) are estimated to
shift from one Poisson demand distribution to another (leisure to business) corresponding
at the twenty-one and fourteen day APD, respectively. These increases coincide with the
prevalence of the routes’ APD requirements; however, the γt parameters for these two
markets are insignificant.
The second set of parameter estimates reports in the tables are labeled "Poisson Rates",
which report mean arrival rates for each of the specified time intervals. These functions
are also plotted below in Figure 4 (right panel). There is heterogeneity in these estimates
as well. Several markets have a general increase in the arrival rates over time while others
exhibit a general decreasing trend. The general finding is that the estimated arrival rates are
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low with only a few potential consumers searching to buy a ticket on a particular flight each
day. Combining the γt and µt parameters, I estimate that 23 percent of arrivals are business
travelers. As a point of comparison, Lazarev (2013) estimates 20 percent of consumers are
business travelers. All arrival rates are estimated to be statistically significant.
Finally, the last row, "Firm Shock", reports estimates of the scaling parameter. The model
is estimated with prices scaled to hundreds of dollars ($100 = 1). All of these parameters
are estimated to be less than one and are statistically significant.
5.3 Model Fit and Discussion
Figure 5: Model Fit by Day Before Departure

















Mean: Model, no fare restrictions
5th,95th Percentiles: Data
5th,95th Percentiles: Model
Note: Comparison of mean data fares and mean model fares across the booking horizon. Two versions of model fares are
plotted. The solid black line defines per-period price choice sets using fare restrictions in the data. The dashed grey line
allows firms to choose from all prices each period.
The model fits the data well. Figure 5 shows within-sample model fit by plotting data
and model fares over time. Model fares are shown under the choice set restrictions in the
estimated model as well as with the restrictions removed—firms have access to the entire
choice set in each period. The figure depicts means as well as the fifth and ninety-fifth
percentiles of fares. Model fares closely follow observed fares, with an average difference of
$6.35. Differences do vary by day before departure—they are less than $10 for the first half
of the sample but the gap increases around APDs. The reason is that the model produces
a smoother fare profile that results in fare hikes slightly before the fourteen and seven
day APDs. The model accurately captures the use of the twenty-one day APD. The fifth
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and ninety-fifth percentiles of fares are also aligned, except for close to the departure date,
where the top five percent of data fares are higher than what the model assigns.
The dashed line, corresponding to model fares where the firm utilizes the entire choice
set, also closely follows the data except close to the deadline. Within the last week before
departure, the unrestricted model assigns lower prices. This is because fares are lowered
in order to leave fewer seats unsold. One view on this finding is that the utilization of fare
restrictions acts as a reputation mechanism that allows firms to commit to high prices close
to the date of travel, even for flights with excess capacity.26
Figure 6 plots the value functions and policy functions for the Boston, MA - San Diego,
CA city pair, focusing on the two state variables, seats remaining and time left to sell.
The horizontal axis denotes seats remaining. The four lines cover selected periods (fifteen,
thirty, forty-five and sixty days before departure).
Figure 6: Model Policy Functions and Value Functions (Boston, MA - San Diego, CA)



































Note: Model policy functions and value functions for four periods. This figure demonstrates pricing and revenues for the
Boston, MA - San Diego, CA city pair.
The left panel shows how seats remaining and time left to sell influence expected rev-





Vt(c + 1, ω)dHω. However, the curves flatten out as it becomes increasingly unlikely that
the firm will sell all remaining capacity. The curves for each time period become completely
flat as the probability of sell outs becomes zero. The plot also shows that expected values







With five seats remaining, expected revenues are very similar with either forty-five or sixty
26Dana and Williams (2020) show in a theoretical model that inventory controls can be used to commit to
increasing prices in a competitive setting.
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days remaining, because remaining capacity is low relative to the sales horizon. Here, the
firm is confident that it can sell at units at high prices. As the booking horizon grows, the
firm expects to sell more seats, even if it does not expect to sell out. The revenue difference
is shown by the gaps between the lines in the right side of the graph.
The right panel depicts the policy functions and demonstrates an important interaction
between the estimated arrival process and scarcity. The horizontal axis again shows re-
maining capacity, and the four lines are separate time periods. The vertical axis shows
the expected price using the conditional choice probabilities from the model, that is,∫
ptCCPt(c, t). Scarcity is shown by the general upward trend or negative relationship
between capacity and price. For any given period, if capacity is high, prices are low. This
is because the opportunity cost of capacity is decreasing in seats remaining. The highest
prices occur with very limited capacity and a long sales horizon. This is because the firm
can always decrease price if it does not sell.
The effect of changing preferences is demonstrated by comparing the fifteen-day line
with the other lines. The probability of selling forty units is very low, but the optimal price
is higher than in other the other periods shown because arriving consumers have higher
willingness to pay. In a homogeneous Poisson demand model, such as in Gallego and
Van Ryzin (1994), this pricing line curve would be substantially lower because preferences
do not cause prices to increase over time. As the plot shows, with fewer than ten units
remaining, both scarcity and intertemporal price discrimination are important, and prices
increase sharply.
6 Analysis of the Estimated Model
In this section, I conduct a series of counterfactuals given the model estimates. I com-
pare firm revenues and consumer surplus under dynamic pricing with several alternative
pricing regimes. In Section 6.1, I investigate uniform pricing and dynamic pricing with a
restriction to frequency of price adjustments. In Section 6.2, I solve for a pricing system
in which firms commit to a pricing schedule that depends on time until departure but
not on demand realizations. By comparing uniform pricing to this latter counterfactual,
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which I call the intermediate case, I quantify the relative influence of intertemporal price
discrimination and dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand in airline markets. I further
explore the use of intertemporal price discrimination by studying static pricing problems,
where prices reflect per-period preferences. In Section 6.3, I consider hypothetical arrival
processes. Finally, in Section 6.4, I show that in order to quantify the effects of intertempo-
ral price discrimination in airline markets, it is essential to account for stochastic demand.
Procedures that abstract from stochastic demand will infer that late-arriving consumers are
too price insensitive.
For each counterfactual, I use the empirical distribution of remaining capacity sixty
days before departure as the initial capacity condition. Note that it may be profitable for
firms to adjust capacity if the unmodeled fixed costs are such that the counterfactual pricing
systems support a different gauge of aircraft. I explore the role of initial capacity at the end
of Section 6.2.
For each counterfactual, I simulate 100,000 flights per market and then combine the
results over markets.27 I report the following benchmarks:
• Fare: mean price;
• Load Factor: mean load factor on day of departure;
• Sell outs: percentage of flights that sell all initial capacity;
• Revenue: mean revenue per flight;
• CSiL: mean leisure consumer surplus per passenger;
• CSiB: mean business consumer surplus per passenger;
• Welfare: mean daily combined consumer surplus and revenues per flight.
I alter the firm problem in all counterfactuals in two ways. First, I allow firms to use
the unrestricted choice set, A(t) = ∪Tt=0A(t), in each period. Counterfactuals without this
adjustment appear in the appendix. Second, I remove the firm shocks for the following
analysis. I do this in order to single out the effect of time remaining and capacity, rather
than the role of unobservable errors, in determining the pricing decision. For example,
under uniform pricing, the firm would receive a single error vector, whereas in the dynamic
27I exclude the three markets observed to have infrequent service and frequent spikes in last-minute bookings
(Lihue, HI - Portland, OR; Palm Springs, CA - Portland, OR; Santa Barbara, CA - Seattle, WA). Results are
robust to including these markets.
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counterfactual, the firm receives per-period error shocks. By removing the unobservable
from the firm’s problem, quantifying the impact of price discrimination across pricing
regimes is salient.
All counterfactuals utilize the important boundary conditions of the initial problem:
(1) the firm cannot oversell; (2) unused capacity is scrapped with zero value. Capacity
transitions as before.
6.1 Uniform Pricing
I start by removing the firm’s ability to price discriminate. The firm maximizes expected
revenues subject to the constraint that it must charge a uniform price in each period. The
optimal price depends on the initial capacity condition and the distributions of demand















Under uniform pricing, a high price can be used to target business customers. However,
arrivals are sufficiently low that it will result in unused capacity. Lowering the price will
allow additional leisure consumers to purchase, thus expanding output, but it will also
decrease revenues per seat sold. The optimal price balances out these effects.
Results for the counterfactual appear in Table & Figure 2. In the figure, the left panel
plots mean fares over time (the dashed lines show the interquartile distributions). Uni-
form fares are relatively higher than dynamic fares early on, but then uniform fares are
considerably lower than that under dynamic fares close to the departure date. This results
in a reallocation of capacity over time, which is shown graphically in the right panel. The
right panel plots the booking curve, or mean cumulative seats sold divided by capacity,
over time. The uniform pricing booking curve is bowed out as fewer consumers purchase
under the relatively high fares early on. Relatively low fares close to the departure date
result in a higher booking rate. However, even with this increase in late bookings, total
output is lower under uniform pricing (3.1 percent lower load factor). Because the firm
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cannot respond to demand shocks, load factors under uniform pricing are considerably
more dispersed.
Table & Figure 2: Dynamic to Uniform Pricing
Fare Load Factor Sell Outs Revenue CSiL CS
i
B Welfare
Dynamic 242.9 87.8 17.9 11533.5 49.3 161.9 468.0
Uniform 223.7 84.7 28.5 10565.5 46.4 180.2 464.5
Difference (%) -7.9 -3.1 10.6 -8.4 -6.0 11.3 -0.7







































Note: Fare: mean fare for flight observations with positive seats remaining; Load factor (LF): average at
departure time; Sell Outs: percentage of flights with zero seats remaining in the last period; Revenue: mean
flight revenue; Consumer surplus (CSiL,CS
i
B): surplus per-person; Welfare: daily mean revenues plus consumer
surplus, excluding fixed costs. Results come from simulating 100,000 flights per market given the empirical
distribution of remaining capacity sixty days before departure.
The reallocation of capacity over time necessarily means a reallocation of capacity across
consumer types. The top of Table & Figure 2 reports key benchmarks for the two pricing
regimes. All values are in levels, except for load factor and sell outs, which are reported as
percentages. The difference row is relative to dynamic pricing—a negative number means
the value is higher under dynamic pricing. The table shows that leisure consumers are
harmed by uniform pricing. This is because fares are higher in early periods. I estimate
leisure consumer surplus declines 6.0 percent under uniform pricing. On the other hand,
business consumers benefit from considerably lower fares under uniform pricing—flights
are up to $150 less expensive. I estimate business consumer surplus increases by 11.3
percent under uniform pricing. Although this is a significant gain, it is mitigated somewhat
by the fact that the firm cannot ensure all business consumers are served under uniform
pricing. Sell outs increase by 10.6 percent because the firm cannot respond to demand
shocks, and 5.3 percent of arriving business customers cannot obtain a seat. Under dynamic
pricing, only 1.2 percent of business travelers cannot obtain a seat. Combining the effects
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across the two consumer types, aggregate consumer surplus increases by 4.6 percent when
the firm cannot use dynamic pricing.
Both the uncertainty about demand and the change in preferences of consumers over
time impact the welfare effects of dynamic pricing. Although the relative importance of
these forces varies across markets, two findings broadly apply. First, uniform pricing
largely reallocates consumer surplus from leisure travelers to business customers. Because
business customers have significantly higher willingness to pay, I find the uniform pricing
increases consumer surplus. Second, uniform pricing results in significantly reduced
revenues; I estimate the decline to be 8.4 percent.28 Combining both the revenue and
consumer surplus effects, I find that uniform pricing lowers total welfare by 0.7 percent in
the monopoly markets studied.
The Role of Frequent Price Adjustments
The previous exercise compares the extremes in pricing capabilities of the firm, where
prices are allowed to adjust based on time and seats remaining, or prices are held fixed
for all periods. Now I allow the firm to use dynamic pricing, with the restriction that
prices must be maintained for k days. I conduct six counterfactuals, corresponding to
k = 2, 3, 6, 10, 20, 30. The idea here is that dynamic pricing is clearly valuable to the firm,
but it is not necessarily true that daily price adjustments are needed to obtain the revenues
observed under (daily) dynamic pricing.
Figure 7 plots the revenue loss compared with the baseline case of daily price adjust-
ments. The bottom bar shows the revenue loss under the uniform pricing scenario just
discussed. The ability to update prices just once reduces the revenue loss compared uni-
form pricing by half (30-day adjustments). An additional price adjustment yields another
2.2 percent gain. I find that two-day, three-day, and six-day adjustments yield fairly similar
results. This suggests that several demand shocks can be observed before requiring a price
adjustment for revenues to be similar.
28IATA (2013) reports airline profit margins are around 1.1%, inclusive of ancillary income and debt interest.
Revenue Management Overview claims revenue management systems have increased airline revenues by
3-9% over time.
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Figure 7: The Role of Frequent Price Adjustments















Revenue Loss Relative to Dynamic
Note: Revenue drop relative to dynamic (daily) pricing for all markets. For example, 3-day corresponds to firms utilizing
dynamic pricing, but restricting the number of price updates to 3-day intervals.
6.2 The Use of Intertemporal Price Discrimination Alone
I now solve for optimal pricing where the firm commits to a price schedule that varies
across time but not on the realizations of demand. I call this "the use of intertemporal price
discrimination alone", or "the intermediate case." The reason for this label is that dynamic
pricing varies by seats and time remaining, p∗(ct, t), and uniform pricing does not vary
along either of those two dimensions, p∗. In the intermediate case, prices solely depend on

























︸               ︷︷               ︸
Dynamic Pricing
.
By comparing dynamic pricing with uniform pricing, and dynamic pricing with the in-
termediate case, I quantify the relative importance of having fares respond to preferences
versus fares respond to both preferences and demand shocks.
















This is a large dimensional problem—an exhaustive search involves evaluating the objective
over dim(A)T possible price vectors. At a minimum, the problem contains approximately
8.6e41 possibilities. To reduce the dimensionality of the problem, I add the restriction that
the firm can adjust fares only on the usual advance purchase discount days: three, seven,
fourteen, and twenty-one days before departure. This results in five prices per flight.
Table & Figure 3: Dynamic Pricing to Intermediate Case
Fare Load Factor Sell Outs Revenue CSiL CS
i
B Welfare
Dynamic 242.9 87.8 17.9 11533.5 49.3 161.9 468.0
Intermediate 244.4 83.7 21.4 11212.4 48.1 158.9 456.4
Difference (%) 0.6 -4.1 3.6 -2.8 -2.5 -1.8 -2.5







































Note: Fare: mean fare for flight observations with positive seats remaining; Load factor (LF): average at
departure time; Sell Outs: percentage of flights with zero seats remaining in the last period; Revenue: mean
flight revenue; Consumer surplus (CSiL,CS
i
B): surplus per-person; Welfare: daily mean revenues plus consumer
surplus, excluding fixed costs. Results come from simulating 100,000 flights per market given the empirical
distribution of remaining capacity sixty days before departure.
Results for this counterfactual appear in Table & Figure 3. Fares in the intermediate
case are monotonically increasing, with a substantial increase in fares when crossing the
first three APDs. This largely reflects changes in willingness to pay over time. Because the
firm cannot respond to demand shocks, load factors are 4.1 lower and more dispersed than
under dynamic pricing.
Just like dynamic pricing, the use of intertemporal price discrimination alone increases
leisure consumer surplus relative to uniform pricing due to lower initial fares. As time
advances, arriving leisure consumers face higher prices due to the increased presence of
business consumers. I find that leisure consumer surplus is increasing as pricing becomes
more flexible (dynamic > intermediate > uniform). In contrast, I find business consumer
surplus is highest under uniform pricing and lowest in the intermediate case. In the
intermediate case, the inability to respond to demand shocks results in high prices, even
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for flights with low realized demand. Moreover, sellouts increase by 3.6 percent, and an
additional 4.2 percent of arriving business customers are not served. In addition, revenues
are 2.8 percent lower when the firm cannot respond to demand shocks, hence, total welfare
declines in the intermediate case.
Combining both counterfactuals, 66 percent of the revenue gains associated with dy-
namic pricing over uniform pricing come from intertemporal price discrimination (the
intermediate case). The remainder comes from the ability to respond to demand shocks.
Dynamic pricing increases revenues two ways. First, for flights realized to have low de-
mand, prices are adjusted downward in order to leave fewer seats unsold. Second, for
flights realized to have high demand, output is constrained, but prices adjust upward in
order to save seats for business consumers who are then charged high prices.
Static Pricing and Responding to Consumer Types
In the previous counterfactuals, the firm takes expectations over future demand when
committing to prices in the initial period. Prices in the intermediate case adjust solely based
on time remaining, but they also reflect aggregate demand uncertainty. To understand how
increasing prices reflect intertemporal price discrimination isolated from scarcity, I examine
static revenue maximization problems. When the firm is not forward looking, the optimal
price solely reflects the demand it faces in each period.











Here, the optimal price in each period depends on the current arrival process and the current
capacity constraint. When capacity becomes sufficiently low relative to the expected per-
period demand, prices will reflect that scarcity. This problem is equivalent to the original
dynamic pricing problem with the discount factor set equal to zero.
To completely remove the impact of remaining capacity on prices, I consider an alter-









Since demand is independent over time, this model is equivalent to the original dynamic
pricing model with an infinite capacity constraint.
The results of these counterfactuals appear in Table & Figure 4. In the figure, the
three curves represent dynamic pricing and the two static models described above. The
interquartile range lines are removed for readability. I refer to "static pricing" (or "static
model") when referring to the model with capacity constraints and "static∞ pricing" (or
"static∞ model") when referring to the model without a capacity limit. I use the term "static
models" (plural form) to refer to both simultaneously. In the table, only numbers for the
static model are reported.
Table & Figure 4: Static Pricing
Fare Load Factor Sell Outs Revenue CSiL CS
i
B Welfare
Dynamic 242.9 87.8 17.9 11533.5 49.3 161.9 468.0
Static 190.3 91.6 60.8 9617.5 56.5 141.6 421.8
Difference (%) -21.7 3.8 43.0 -16.6 14.5 -12.5 -9.9














Static Pricing, No Capacity Limit























Note: Fare: mean fare for flight observations with positive seats remaining; Load factor (LF): average at
departure time; Sell Outs: percentage of flights with zero seats remaining in the last period; Revenue: mean
flight revenue; Consumer surplus (CSiL,CS
i
B): surplus per-person; Welfare: daily mean revenues plus consumer
surplus, excluding fixed costs. Results come from simulating 100,000 flights per market given the empirical
distribution of remaining capacity sixty days before departure.
The figure shows three notable findings. First, optimal prices for the static models are
well below the baseline dynamic pricing model. When the firm internalizes the scarcity
of seats, opportunity costs raise prices. The plot shows capacity plays a significant role in
pricing, raising prices close to $50 relative to the static models. Second, both of the static
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pricing models naturally create APDs because preferences change systematically over time
and prices are chosen from a discrete set. As the share of business consumers increases, if
capacity remains, the optimal static price increases discreetly. Third, static∞ pricing closely
follows static pricing, except when capacity becomes sufficiently scarce. For example,
optimal prices differ when there is one seat left and the demand rate is sufficiently high,
but prices coincide when fifty seats remain.
The results in Table & Figure 4 show stark contrasts between static pricing and dynamic
pricing. Static pricing results in a 16.6 percent decline in revenues, nearly double the drop
estimated under the uniform pricing counterfactual. Output is the highest among all the
models considered, which makes sense since the firm does not value holding capacity for
future periods. Leisure consumers greatly benefit from static pricing—they arrive first and
enjoy low prices. However, business consumer surplus under static pricing is estimated
to be the lowest among all the models considered. Fares are lower than under dynamic
pricing, but availability is limited and this force dominates. This is shown in Figure 8,
which plots the cumulative distribution of sell outs (left) and cumulative consumer surplus
relative to dynamic pricing (right).
Figure 8: Cumulative Distributions of Sell Outs and Consumer Surplus





















































Note: Revenue drop relative to dynamic (daily) pricing for all markets. For example, 3-day corresponds to firms utilizing
dynamic pricing, but restricting the number of price updates to 3-day intervals.
The Role of Initial Capacity
In the static pricing counterfactuals, static prices are substantially lower than dynamic
prices. This is because the firm does not internalize that selling a seat today forgoes
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the increased revenue opportunity of selling the seat to a business consumer tomorrow.
Dynamic pricing helps ensure that scarce capacity is allocated efficiently and results in
substantially higher revenues. However, if the firm had enough initial capacity, it could sell
a seat to all arriving customers.
To investigate this further, I analyze how the initial capacity constraint affects dynamic
prices. Specifically, I investigate how large initial capacity has to be in order for static
pricing to be a reasonable approximation of the environment. To accomplish this, I compute
optimal dynamic prices and simulate outcomes for a wide range of initial capacity values.
Figure 9 shows the counterfactual for Fresno, CA = Portland, OR. In the left panel,
the horizontal axis is the initial capacity condition. The left vertical axis is the percentage
change in sales from increasing the initial capacity constraint by one. The steepness of the
curve in early values reflects the fact that the firm will almost surely sell the additional
unit. The curve starts to flatten and eventually approaches zero as additional capacity will
not be sold. The right vertical axis plots total expected revenues by initial capacity. The
(black) vertical line depicts the average observed initial capacity. The (grey) square denotes
revenues with six fewer seats than the average (a row of a plane); the (blue) triangle denotes
the minimum initial capacity such that prices follow a non-stochastic model.29
Figure 9: Initial Capacity Counterfactual (Fresno, CA - Portland, OR)



















Percent Change in Sales with +1 Capacity
Avg. Observed Capacity






























Note: The left panel shows the percentage change in quantity sold by increasing the initial capacity constraint by one (dotted
blue). Also show are expected revenues by initial capacity constraint (dashed grey). The black vertical line shows the
(weighted) average initial capacity observed in the data. The black dot shows expected revenues under this capacity. The
grey square shows expected revenues with six fewer seats. The blue triangle shows expected revenues in the first instance
when the percentage change in quantity sold is less than 0.1%. The right panel shows average prices over time for those
three scenarios (average less ten, average, and the limiting case).
29I calculate this point is the first instance in which the percentage change in expected sales from increasing
capacity by one is less than 0.1 percent.
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The right panel plots average prices over time for the three initial capacities just de-
scribed. The dashed blue (triangle) line shows the limiting case, where dynamic prices
correspond to static prices. If the firm starts with fewer initial seats, realizations of demand
impact prices.
I repeat this exercise for all markets in order to calculate the percentage of observed
flights where optimal prices can be approximated using a static model. To do this, I
calculate the capacity threshold for each market and then compare this threshold to the
observed distribution of initial capacity. I find that 22 percent of the observed flights meet
this threshold, meaning that stochastic demand and scarcity play an important role for a
large majority of the flights studied.
6.3 Highlighting the Interaction under an Alternative Arrival Process
The importance of responding to demand shocks depends on the particular arrival process
of consumers. I demonstrate this by considering a hypothetical environment in which
preferences do not change over time, thereby removing the incentive to utilize intertem-
poral price discrimination. More specifically, I take the arrival rates to be equal to the
average over time, by market. I also assign the proportion of business and leisure travelers
to be equal to the average over time, by market. Thus, demand remains stochastic, but
preferences are held fixed.
Table & Figure 5 contains the results for dynamic pricing and uniform pricing. The
intermediate case is also plotted. The results show that average prices can increase (for
much of the booking horizon) even when preferences do not change over time.30 The reason
why average prices increase is that the purchase rate is sufficiently low relative to remaining
capacity and the deadline. The firm does not expect to sell many (any) seats in a given
period, so when a sale does occur, this drives up the opportunity cost of capacity and price.
There is a natural asymmetry: firms can choose to cut prices in later periods but cannot
recover sold seats after a positive demand shock. A change in the arrival rate, holding all
else constant, changes the shape of average prices. For example, with the arrival process
multiplied by two, prices are mostly flat, except for a drop at the deadline. When the arrival
30Similar simulated optimal price paths can be found in Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) and McAfee and
Te Velde (2006), for example.
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Table & Figure 5: Constant Arrival Process
Fare Load Factor Sell Outs Revenue CSiL CS
i
B Welfare
Dynamic 223.3 90.6 25.2 10948.1 49.1 202.6 479.2
Intermediate 226.3 86.3 27.1 10735.5 47.9 197.5 468.6
Uniform 224.9 84.4 27.6 10625.3 47.1 196.5 464.3









































Note: Fare: mean fare for flight observations with positive seats remaining; Load factor (LF): average at
departure time; Sell Outs: percentage of flights with zero seats remaining in the last period; Revenue: mean
flight revenue; Consumer surplus (CSiL,CS
i
B): surplus per-person; Welfare: daily mean revenues plus consumer
surplus, excluding fixed costs. Results come from simulating 100,000 flights per market given the empirical
distribution of remaining capacity sixty days before departure.
process is multiplied by four, average prices decline over time. This is because the firm
expects to sell seats each period, but when it receives a low demand shock, opportunity
costs decline and prices are lowered.31 Thus, stochastic demand alone can affect the shape
of average prices over time. In the next subsection, I show the importance of accounting
for stochastic demand when identifying intertemporal price discrimination.
Relative to the estimated arrival process, this counterfactual brings less dispersion in
prices, sell outs, revenues, and consumer surpluses. One of the predictions in Gallego and
Van Ryzin (1994) is that the value of dynamic pricing is lower under constant arrival. My
empirical findings support this theory. The comparative revenue gains of dynamic pricing
over uniform pricing are almost three times higher under the observed arrival process
compared with this counterfactual (8.4 percent versus 3.0 percent).
6.4 Demand Elasticities Abstracting from Stochastic Demand
This paper demonstrates that stochastic demand is an essential feature of airline markets,
and it quantifies how stochastic demand interacts with a changing mix of consumer types
31This intuition focuses on the arrival rate but the variance of arrivals also affects prices in a similar way.
The Poisson distribution is equidispersed. I do not isolate the effect driven by the variance.
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toward the perishability date. If demand is stochastic and capacity is scarce, but we abstract
from this feature of the market, we will infer the incorrect demand elasticites. To understand
why, note that empirical procedures that abstract from stochastic demand assign a constant
opportunity cost of remaining capacity over time. In reality, opportunity costs adjust
according to the realizations of demand. I demonstrate that the bias in estimated elasticities
can be significant, and the direction of the bias depends on the arrival process.
Consider the special limiting case of the model presented in this paper where demand
uncertainty is degenerate. A monopolist faces a series of sequential markets with finite,
fixed capacity. Without any demand uncertainty, the firm problem can be written as a





































where eDt (pt) ∈ R+ is the elasticity of demand. This can be rearranged to obtain
pt =
eDt (pt)
eDt (pt) − 1
c.
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. (Model without stochastic demand)
Importantly, the shadow values cancel as they do not change across periods. This is
convenient because it suggests that just by looking at relative prices in the data, we can
recover the elasticity ratio in this special limiting case.











. (Model with stochastic demand)
This suggests that if we were to investigate the welfare effects of airline pricing by abstract-
ing from stochastic demand, we would infer the incorrect price elasticities, depending on
how the opportunity costs of capacity (c̃s) change over time.
Figure 10 plots the median as well as the interquartile range of elasticity ratios for
both situations. The plot contains 100,000 simulated flights per market. The elasticity ratio
accounting for stochastic demand come directly from the estimated model, and the elasticity
ratio abstracting from stochastic demand are derived from relative prices. In Figure 10, the
difference in the lines informs the bias. It shows that the empirical procedure that abstracts
from stochastic demand will estimate consumers as being too price insensitive as the line is
above the true elasticity ratio—the ratio is increasing in consumer price insensitivity. This
occurs because the shadow values (c̃s) tend to rise over time due to the arrival of price
insensitive customers. Within the last three weeks before departure, prices rise sharply
and the bias increases significantly.32
32The direction of the bias depends on the particular arrival process of consumers. If price inelastic consumers
were the first to arrive, the direction of the bias would be opposite—the procedure that abstracts from stochastic
demand will infer late arrivals as too price sensitive. This is because the shadow values tend to decline toward
the perishability date. On the other hand, under constant elasticity, the bias tends to be close to zero.
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Figure 10: Bias When Abstracting from Stochastic Demand



















Not Abstracting - Median
Abstracting - Interquartile Range
Not Abstracting - Interquartile Range
Note: Results come from simulating 100,000 per market. The bias lines correspond to an elasticity ratio abstracting from
stochastic demand. The model elasticity ratios are recovered using the model accounting for stochastic demand.
7 Conclusion
Airfares fluctuate over time due to both demand shocks and intertemporal variation in
willingness to pay. The main contribution of this paper is to jointly study intertempo-
ral price discrimination and dynamic adjustment in response to stochastic demand and
quantify their interactions. I do so by examining the pricing decisions of airlines in US
monopoly markets with novel data containing high frequency fares and seat availabilities
and a structural model that accounts for both forces.
I find that dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand complements intertemporal price
discrimination in airline markets. This is because of the particular arrival process of
consumers. By having fares respond to demand shocks, airlines offer discounts to early-
arriving, price sensitive consumers. It also allows them to secure seats for late-arriving
consumers who are then charged high prices. I show that dynamic airline pricing results
in more capacity utilization and significantly higher revenues. From a welfare perspective,
I show that uniform pricing results in higher consumer surplus in nearly all of the mar-
kets studied, but total welfare tends to be higher under dynamic pricing. This is because
the revenue gains can exceed the consumer surplus losses, particularly because price dis-
crimination increases leisure consumer surplus and decreases business consumer surplus.
Finally, I show that in order to study intertemporal price discrimination in airline markets,
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it is essential to account for stochastic demand.
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Figure 11: Average Fares over Time by Market
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Average fares over time for each market separately. This analysis combines origin-destination and destination-origin
fares. Both axes are common across all plots.
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Figure 12: Percent Change in Fares over Time by Market
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Percent change in average fares over time for each market separately. This analysis combines origin-destination and









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 13: Fitted Values of γt over Time for Each Market
















































































































































































































































Note: Estimates of γt for each market separately. The function γt is defined as exp(γ1 + γ1t + γ1t2)/(1 + exp(γ1 + γ1t + γ1t2)).
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Counterfactuals with Restricted Pricing Choice Set
Table & Figure 9: Dynamic to Uniform Pricing (Restricted Choice Set)
Fare Load Factor Sell Outs Revenue CSiL CS
i
B Welfare
Dynamic 243.7 87.6 16.5 11475.0 49.4 161.5 466.7
Uniform 223.7 84.7 28.5 10565.5 46.4 180.2 464.5
Difference (%) -8.2 -2.9 12.0 -7.9 -6.1 11.6 -0.5








































Table & Figure 10: Dynamic Pricing to Intermediate Case (Restricted Choice Set)
Fare Load Factor Sell Outs Revenue CSiL CS
i
B Welfare
Dynamic 243.7 87.6 16.5 11475.0 49.4 161.5 466.7
Intermediate 244.6 83.7 21.0 11188.0 48.1 158.8 456.0
Difference (%) 0.4 -4.0 4.5 -2.5 -2.5 -1.7 -2.3










































Using the publicly available DB1B data, I select origin-destination pairs to study. These
data contain a 10 percent sample of bookings and are at the quarterly level. The data
contain neither the date of travel nor the date of purchase.
I first combine traffic from all airports in which there exists a nearby airport within
sixty miles. This combines, for example, Laguardia (LGA), John F. Kennedy (JFK), and
Newark (EWR).33 Next, I focus on ODs with a nonstop option; this reduces the number
of potential markets studied from 80,000 to 10,000. Over 70 percent of these markets have
a single carrier providing nonstop service and they make up a total of 10 percent of OD
traffic in the United States. Out of these 10,000, I implement the following cleaning criteria:
(1) total quarterly traffic, including connecting traffic with up to four stops, exceeds 600
passengers;34 (2) a single carrier operates nonstop on the OD leg. This reduces the number
of potential markets by over half, to roughly 4,000.
Next, I calculate the following statistics: (1) OD nonstop traffic; (2) OD total traffic
(including one-stop connections, all the way up to four-stop connections); (3) passenger
traffic connecting to OD or connecting from OD, which again is allowed to have at most
five legs. The fraction (1)/(2) calculates the percentage of traffic flying nonstop. The fraction
33This creates the following groupings: (DAB, MCO, SFB); (OGD, SLC); (EWN, OAJ); (KOA, MUE); (SBP,
SMX); (AZA, PHX); (BRO, HRL, MFE); (CMI, DEC); (PIE, SRQ, TPA); (MHT, PSM); (BUR, LAX, LGB, ONT,
SNA); (BTV, PBG); (BFM, MOB); (HHH, SAV); (DAL, DFW); (EVV, OWB); (MSS, OGS); (BQN, MAZ); (PSG,
WRG); (HOU, IAH); (ORF, PHF); (FAT, VIS); (ATW, GRB); (PAE, SEA); (LNS, MDT); (CLT, USA); (OAK, SFO,
SJC); (AOO, JST, LBE); (BLV, STL); (CPX, SPB, STT, VQS); (LWS, PUW); (BGM, ELM, ITH); (BGR, BHB); (ACK,
EWB, HYA, MVY, PVC, PVD, BOS); (BWI, DCA, IAD); (CLD, SAN); (CHO, SHD); (ASE, EGE); (SCM, VAK);
(GYY, MDW, ORD); (BUF, IAG); (CMH, LCK); (PHL, TTN); (PGD, RSW); (FLL, MIA); (HNM, JHM, LNY, LUP,
MKK, OGG); (MCE, MOD, SCK); (LEB, RUT); (CKB, MGW); (GLV, WMO); (EWR, HPN, HVN, ISP, JFK, LGA,
SWF).
34This is calculated as half a fifty-seat plane, offering at least weekend service (eight monthly flights), for
the quarter, e.g. .5*50*8*3 = 600. This level of the criterion is not critical, but a minimum passenger threshold
of 10 (scaling 1 passenger up to 10, as it is a 10% sample) is important because it removes erroneous entries in
the DB1B. For example, in 2012, United Airlines did not operate nonstop between Lehigh Valley International
Airport (ABE) and Nashville (BNA). Another method is to look at scheduled service in the T100 segment
tables.
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(1)/[(1) + (3)] calculates the percentage of traffic not connecting. Shown another way,
FracNonstop :=
Passengers OD Nonstop
(Passengers OD Nonstop) + (Passengers OD ≥ 1 Stops)
:=
(O→ D)
(O→ D) + (O→ C→ D)
,
where C denotes potential connections for passengers flying on OD. Using similar notation,
FracNotConnecting :=
(O→ D)
(O→ D) + (C→ O→ D) + (O→ D→ C)
,
which is simply the fraction of passengers on planes flying OD that are not connecting on
either end.
Single carrier markets have percent nonstop and percent non-connecting means of 74
percent and 55 percent as compared with 81 percent and 59 percent for competitive markets
(medians of 80 percent, 52 percent, 86 percent, 59 percent, respectively). I limit myself to
markets with at most 15,000 monthly passengers. This is to keep the data collection process
manageable.
The two fractions are negatively correlated (ρ = −0.34), each is correlated with distance.
The correlation between percentage non-connecting and distance is 0.23; nearby ODs have
higher connecting traffic. The correlation between percentage nonstop and distance is
−0.53; nearby ODs have a higher percentage of nonstop traffic. Both make intuitive
sense. Passengers at small spoke airports connect to a nearby hub and then travel to their
destinations. Hence, non-connecting traffic decreases with distance. On the other hand,
nonstop traffic percentage is strongly correlated with distance: if a passenger wants to fly
from Madison, WI to Chicago, IL, it makes little sense to connect in Detroit, MI. ODs in
with a nonstop percentage above 95 percent, are ODs with an average distance of 400 miles;
ODs below 95 percent have an average distance of over 1,000 miles.
It may make sense to maximize both metrics in selecting routes. There is one important
caveat. Although a high nonstop percentage implies consumers are not connecting to reach
their destination via a flight, it does not mean alternative transportation options for these
consumers (such as trains) do not exist. In 2019, there exist 661 ODs that meet the arbitrary
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threshold of 95 percent in both metrics. Of those ODs, 607 are operated by low-cost carriers
Allegiant Air and Spirit Airlines. Unfortunately, both airlines charge for a seat assignment;
thus, utilizing seat maps to determine bookings will likely be inaccurate. The next two
carriers that commonly meet threshold criteria are JetBlue Airways and Alaska Airlines.
I select fifty ODs and concentrate data collection on two carriers, JetBlue Airways and
Alaska Airlines. In addition, for a comparison in the descriptive analysis, I collect data on
six duopoly markets.35 Figure 14 maps the markets and Table 11 provides a dictionary for
the airport codes. The data were collected in two phases: The data on markets operated
by JetBlue were collected in 2012, and the data for Alaska Air Lines were collected in 2019.
Prices for data collected in 2012 are adjusted for inflation.
Figure 14: Markets of Study
Note: Map of the markets selected for study. All of the markets either start or end at Seattle, WI; Portland, OR; and Boston,
MA.
Figure 15 depicts all OD pairs in the DB1B data that meet the thresholds stated above.
Each dot corresponds to an OD pair. The vertical axis reports the percentage (0-100) of
non-connecting traffic. The horizontal axis reports the percentage of nonstop traffic. The
left panel (a) includes all markets, and the right panel (b) removes Allegiant and Spirit
35The city pair Boston, MA - Kansas City, MO was a duopoly market, with nonstop offered by both Delta
Air Lines and Frontier Airlines in 2012. Frontier then exiting the market.
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because of the fee charged to select seats. These 607 ODs removed in (b) lie mostly along
the top of the graph, corresponding to markets with 100 percent non-connecting traffic.
The red squares show the markets selected for data collection and analysis. The dashed
grey lines show the mean of each statistic and the solid black line depicts the fit of a linear
simple regression.
The graphs show the negative correlation between the two statistics previously men-
tioned, with a large cluster of ODs having close to 100 percent nonstop traffic but also very
high levels of connecting traffic. For this study, “ideal" markets arguably lie in the upper
right of the graph. These are markets in which most consumers travel nonstop (versus
one-stop) and do not connect to other flights. Note that this region is less dense compared
with other areas in the graph. The graphs show that all but nine (panel a) or five (panel b)
of the selected markets appear above the regression line, and most lie in the upper-right
region of the graph.
Figure 15: Nonstop and Non-Connecting Traffic in the DB1B
(a) Full Sample




























(b) Removing Allegiant & Spirit




























Note: (a) Percentage nonstop traffic and percentage non-connecting traffic for markets that meet selection criteria in the
DB1B data. (b) Repeat of (a), excluding markets operated by Allegiant and Spirit.
Table 12 provides traffic and price statistics in the DB1B for each OD in the sample.
Note that OD fares are very similar to DO (the reverse) fares in the DB1B, and I use this
finding in order to aggregate observations in estimation. Finally, one-stop fares are not
necessarily cheaper than nonstop options. For example, nonstop fares from Billings, MT
to Seattle, WA are cheaper than one-stop connections.
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Table 11: Airport Code Lookup
Airport Code City Airport Code City
AUS Austin, TX JAX Jacksonville, FL
BIL Billings, MT LIH Lihue, HI
BOI Boise, ID MSO Missoula, MT
BOS Boston, MA OKC Oklahoma, OK
BZN Bozeman, MT OMA Omaha, NE
CHS Charleston, SC PDX Portland, OR
CMH Columbus, OH PSP Palm Springs, CA
FAT Fresno, CA RNO Reno, NV
GEG Spokane, WA SAN San Diego, CA
GTF Great Falls, MT SBA Santa Barbara, CA
HLN Helena, MT STS Santa Rosa, CA











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C Inference and Accuracy of Seat Maps
I utilize airline seat maps to recover bookings for flights. A seat map is a graphical
representation of occupied and unoccupied seats for a given flight at a select point in time
before the departure date. Many airlines that have assigned seating present seat maps to
consumers during the booking process. When a consumer books a ticket and selects a seat,
the seat map changes accordingly. The next consumer wishing to purchase a ticket on the
flight is offered an updated seat map and can choose one of the remaining unoccupied
seats. By differencing seat maps across time—in this case, daily—inferences can be made
about daily bookings.
Unfortunately, seat maps may not accurately represent flight loads. This is especially
problematic if consumers do not select seats at the time of booking. This measurement error
would systematically understate sales early on, but then overstate last-minute sales when
consumers without seat assignments are assigned seats. From a modeling perspective, this
measurement error would lead to an overstatement of the arrival of business consumers.
Ideally, the severity of measurement error of my data could be assessed by matching
changes in seat maps with bookings; however, this is impossible with the publicly available
data. While both are imperfect, I perform two analyses to gauge the magnitude of the
measurement error in using seat maps.
Figure 16: Estimated Seat Map Measurement Error at the Monthly Level
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000





























Note: Measurement error estimated by comparing monthly enplanements, using the T100 Tables and aggregating seat maps
to the monthly level. The solid line reflects zero measurement error.
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First, I match monthly enplanements using my seat maps aggregated on the the day of
departure with actual monthly enplanements reported in the T100 Segment tables. These
tables record the total number of monthly enplanements by airline and route. Figure 16
provides a scatter plot that compares the two statistics. All the points closely follow the
45-degree line, and I find seat maps overstate recorded enplanements, with the median
difference being 2.57 percent. Since seat maps are not obtainable after departure, some of
this difference could be driven by last-minute cancellations.
Second, I create a new data set that allows me to estimate seat-map measurement error
for each day before departure. The mobile version of United.com allows users to examine
seat maps for upcoming flights. In addition, for premium cabins, the airline reports the
number of consumers booked into the cabin. I randomly select flights, departure dates,
and search dates. In total, I obtain 15,567 observations. With these data, I find that seat
maps understate reported load factor by 2.3 percent, or around one to two seats on average.
Figure 17: Estimated Seat Map Measurement Error by Day Before Departure


























Note: Measurement error estimated by comparing seat maps with reported load factor using the United Airlines mobile
website. The dots correspond to the daily mean, and the line corresponds to fitted values of an orthogonal polynomial
regression of the fourth degree. Total sample size is equal to 15,567, with an average load factor of 70.7 percent.
Figure 17 plots the average measurement error by day before departure (t=60 corre-
sponds to the day that flights leave), as well as a polynomial smooth of the data. I find the
difference ranges between 0 to 5 percent across days, or at most four seats. This suggests
seat maps are useful for recovering bookings as the departure date approaches. However,
two caveats are worth noting. First, I cannot reject that the measurement error is constant
64
across days. Seat maps are most accurate far in advance (sixty to forty days out) and close
to the departure date. Second, compared to the main sample, these data cover a different
airline, different markets, and a different cabin.
D Additional Descriptive Analysis
The data show that the patterns documented in monopoly markets are also present in com-
petitive airline markets (in Appendix D.1). I then show that first class tickets also respond
to bookings, and that the trajectory in prices is overwhelmingly positive (in Appendix D.2).
Finally, I discuss how alternative flight options respond to nonstop bookings (in Appendix
D.3).
D.1 Competitive Pricing Dynamics
Figures 18-(a) and 18-(b) recreate Figure 3 and Figure 1, respectively, for markets with
competition. Although more noisy—the sample is one-fifth the size—the general patterns
are present: (i) fares tend to increase when sales occur; (ii) fares tend to decrease when sales
do not occur; (iii) fares increase, regardless of sales, close to the departure date. However,
Figure 3 also suggests, at least for the markets selected, that competition may decrease the
magnitude of systematic fare increases and increase the number of fare decreases.
Figure 18: Fare Dynamics in Competitive Markets
(a) Frequency and Magnitude of Fare Changes by
Day Before Departure



























(b) Fare Response to Sales by Day Before Departure


















Note: (a) Reproduction of Figure 1 for routes with competition. (b) Reproduction of Figure 3 for routes with competition.
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These descriptive facts support findings in Siegert and Ulbricht (2019), use fare data
to show that competition is correlated with a flattening of prices over time. Dana and
Williams (2020) show in a theoretical model of sequential quantity-pricing games that
strong competitive effects work to equalize prices across periods and that inventory controls
can facilitate intertemporal price discrimination in oligopoly. If the role of intertemporal
price discrimination is reduced in competitive markets, this may suggest the efficiency
aspect of dynamic pricing may be higher, and the ability to extract surplus from business
customers lower, compared to the markets studied in this paper.
D.2 Static Forms of Price Discrimination and Dynamic Versioning
Figure 19 shows the average prices and availability of different fare categories over time.
I use the term "fare categories" to describe versioning broadly, different qualities of both
economy tickets as well as first-class ones. Panel (a) shows five different versions of
tickets. Full-fare (refundable) tickets for both economy and first class are flat over time.
Average prices for saver-economy, economy, and first-class tickets raises over time, with
first class and economy class following similar patterns. However, the gap in prices
between saver-economy and economy prices grows as the departure date approaches.
Panel (b) recreates Figure 3 for first class. There are two noticeable differences: the presence
of APDs is diminished in first class; and fare increases are more pronounced throughout
the booking horizon. It is unclear why first-class prices decline forty-five days before
departure, regardless of bookings.36
Figure 19(c) shows the availability of saver-economy, economy, and first-class tickets
over time (full-fare availability closely follows the two respective non-full fare versions).
Panel (c) establishes two results: First, there is a general downward trend in availability
as flights start selling out. Close to departure, economy fare availability abruptly drops
suggesting that the spike in load factor shown in Figure 2 captures last-minute bookings.
Second, the availability of the lowest-quality economy tickets (saver economy) substantially
decreases over time. The large declines coincide with APD restrictions. This implies that
average fares go up over time for two reasons: economy fares become more expensive, and
36The systematic decrease in first-class prices occurs in several, but not all, markets. I find no associated
spike in bookings.
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Figure 19: Fare Category Pricing Dynamics
(a) Mean Fare Category Pricing over Time


















(b) Fare Response to First Class Bookings over Time
















(c) Fare Category Availability over Time




























Note: (a) Mean prices of different fare categories over time. (b) Recreation of Figure 3, but separately showing price effects
for two fare types. (c) Percentage of flights that offer individual fare categories over time. First-class denominator is the
number of flights with first class, not the number of flights in the sample.
saver fares are no longer offered.
D.3 Flight Substitutability: Connecting and Nonstop Options
The data show that connecting flight fares do not respond to nonstop bookings in the same
way as nonstop bookings on nonstop fares. Figure 20(a) recomputes Figure 3; the outcome
is the fare response on connecting fares instead of own-flight fares. The connecting fare
is the average fare among connecting flight options for the same carrier corresponding to
the same departure date and day before departure.37 There are two noticeable differences
between the figures. First, greater than twenty-one days from departure, the two lines
coincide. This means that connecting fares are unaffected by nonstop bookings. Second,
closer to the departure date, unlike Figure 3, I find that connecting fares always increase in
37Specifically, I take the average of connecting flights at the origin-destination-departure date-day before
departure date level and then merge it to the nonstop OD data at the same level.
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both cases (no sales and positive sales).
Figure 20: Pricing Effects on Other Itineraries
(a) Connecting Fare Response



















(b) Multiple Nonstop Prices and Load Factors
0 5 10 15 20 25 30



















Percent Difference in Fare
Note: (a) Recreation of Figure 3, but with connecting fares. Average connecting fare changes as a response to sales by day
before departure. The vertical lines correspond to advance-purchase discount periods (fare fences). The horizontal line
indicates no fare response. (b) Fourth order polynomial fit of a regression of the percent difference in fares on the percent
difference in load factor when a carrier operates two flights a day.
I also use the data to document pricing differences when a carrier offers twice-daily
service. I first calculate the differences over time in load factors and fares across the
two flights. When flights have the same load factor, I find that the average difference in
fares is -.07 percent. Figure 20(b) plots fitted values of a fourth order polynomial fit of
percent difference in fares on the percent difference in load factors. The line is upward
sloping, meaning that the flight with the higher load factor is, on average, more expensive.
Examining fare responses, I find that if one flight sells a seat but the other one does not, the
flight that sells a seat becomes more expensive by $17.78, on average, but the other flight
option becomes $1.40 cheaper.38 We might have expected both prices to increase, owing
to an overall reduction in remaining capacity if airlines internalized the substitution effect.
This outcome is consistent with a model in which the flights are independently priced. It
is also consistent with a learning model in which a demand shock on one flight informs
the airline that the other flight is less preferred.
38The test statistics for these two scenarios are t = 62 and t = −7.
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E Dynamic Demand in Airline Markets
There are noticeable jumps in prices over time, however, the booking curve for flights is
smooth. If consumers are aware that fares tend to increase sharply around APD require-
ments, and they can strategically enter into the market, we should expect to see bunching
in sales before APDs expire and few sales after expiration. At the same time, if enough con-
sumers behaved in this way, having APD on set days before departure is not optimal. Two
possibilities are that (a sufficient number of) consumers do not strategically enter—indeed,
Li, Granados, and Netessine (2014) estimate that between 5 and 20 percent of consumers
dynamically substitute across days—or firms are not correctly responding to the strategic
timing of purchasing tickets.
Theoretical work has considered strategic consumers in durable, storable, and con-
sumption goods markets.39 For the airline context, a relevant paper is Dilmé and Li (2019),
who consider strategic consumers, capacity, and a deadline. They show that in response
to waiting, firms may offer flash sales to reduce inventory, and doing so increases the later
arrivals’ willingness to pay. I do not model this strategic interaction and note that this as-
sumption can impact willingness to pay or timing of participation (Hendel and Nevo, 2013;
Sweeting, 2012). However, unlike environments where prices decrease (Nair, 2007), the
strong upward trajectory of prices greatly diminishes the incentives to delay, conditional
on consumers knowing their preferences.
I investigate bunching (strategic purchasing timing) by modeling the booking curve
as a function of time and include dummy variables for the day-before-departure (DFD)
times immediately before APDs expires. Table 13 reports regression results under three
fixed effects specifications. I find insignificant bunching at the fourteen-day APD period,
although the signs are positive. I find negative bunching at the three-day and twenty-
one-day APD period, meaning sales are lower prior to the price increases. Finally, I find a
positive and significant coefficient for the seven-day APD; that is, sales are higher before
the usual seven-day fare increase. It may be that at least some consumers anticipate price
hikes and time their purchases accordingly.
39These include Stokey (1979); Bulow (1982); Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel (1984); Sobel (1991); Board and
Skrzypacz (2016); Öry (2016).
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Table 13: Consumer Bunching Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
APD3 -1.095∗∗∗ -1.093∗∗∗ -1.091∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.146) (0.146)
APD7 0.389∗∗ 0.388∗∗ 0.387∗∗
(0.0737) (0.0742) (0.0747)
APD14 0.176 0.172 0.173
(0.0959) (0.0925) (0.0919)
APD21 -0.0984 -0.101 -0.101
(0.0545) (0.0503) (0.0500)
m(t) Yes Yes Yes
OD FE Yes Yes −
Month FE Yes Yes −
D.o.W. Search FE No Yes Yes
D.o.W. Departure FE No Yes −
Flight FE No No Yes
Observations 734,297 734,297 734,297
R2 0.593 0.602 0.907
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. m(t) is a sixth-order polynomial in days
before departure, D.o.W. stands for day-of-week indicators for the day the flight leaves
and the day of search. OD-Month clustered standard errors in parentheses.
The collected data make it impossible to discern if a ticket was purchased by a waiting
consumer or a consumer that just arrived. However, if consumers strategically time pur-
chases, we would expect that they not buy immediately after the APD expires—on average
fares only continue to increase. However, I find little evidence for this: the booking rate
after APDs expire is the same as either the booking rate the day before or the booking rate
two days before. This is also the case when the 7-day APD expires. Here, the booking
rate drops by 0.08 for one day and then immediately returns to the same level before the
APD expiration date. This finding supports modeling consumers under Poisson arrivals,
as bookings occur throughout time even though prices rise.
I also investigate the incentive to wait by changing the estimated model in the following
way: after consumers arrive, each consumer has the option to buy a ticket, choose not to
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travel, or wait one additional day to decide. By choosing to wait, each consumer retains
her private valuations (the ε’s) for traveling but may be offered a new price tomorrow.
Consumers have rational expectations regarding future prices. However, in order to wait,
each consumer has to pay a transaction cost φi. This cost reflects the disutility consumers
incur when needing to return to the market in the next period.
I derive a waiting cost φ such that if all consumers have a waiting cost at least as high
as φ, then no one will wait. I then calculate the transaction costs.




ε0, β − αp + ε1,EUwait − φ
}
,




max{ε0, β − αpt+1 + ε1}
]
.
To derive φ, I first investigate the decision to wait for the marginal consumer, or the
consumer such that ε0 = β − αp + ε1. This consumer has no incentive to wait if the price
tomorrow is at least as high as today. If the price drops, the gain from waiting is
ut+1 − ut = (β − αpt+1 + ε1) − (β − αp + ε1)
= α(p − pt+1).








∣∣∣∣ pt+1 < p].






α(p−pt+1) | pt+1 < p
]
.
This leads to the following proposition.






α(p − pt+1) | pt+1 < p
]
, then all consumers will choose
not to wait.
Proof: Take a consumer who wants to purchase today, i.e., ε0 < β − αp + ε1. Then there
exists a p > p such that ε0 = β−αp +ε1. The expected gain for this consumer waiting comes
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from prices dropping below pt and from price increases up to the indifference point. If









∣∣∣∣ pt+1 < p]
+ Pr
(





∣∣∣∣ p < pt+1 ≤ p] − φ.
The first term above is equal to φ, and the second term is less than or equal to zero. Hence,
waiting is not optimal for a consumer wishing to buy today.
Next, consider a consumer who prefers not to buy a ticket today, i.e., ε0 > β − αp + ε1.
Then there exists a p < p such that ε0 = β − αp + ε1. The gains from waiting come from







β − αpt+1 + ε1 − ε0
∣∣∣∣ pt+1 < p] − φ.







β − αpt+1 + ε1 − ε0
∣∣∣∣ pt+1 < p] − Pr(pt+1 < p)E[α(p − pt+1) | pt+1 < p].







β − αpt+1 + ε1 − ε0







β − αpt+1 + ε1 − ε0
∣∣∣∣ pt+1 < p] − E[α(p − pt+1) ∣∣∣∣ pt+1 < p]).







β − αpt+1 + ε1 − ε0 − α(p − pt+1)
∣∣∣∣ pt+1 < p],










≤ 0, since β−αp+ε1−ε0 < 0
by assumption. Hence, waiting is not optimal for a consumer wishing to not buy today. 
For consumers who would purchase today, the gains from waiting are equal to φ, but
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there is an additional cost if prices rise. Hence, waiting is not optimal. For consumers who
would prefer not to buy, the expected gains of waiting are negative.







∣∣∣∣ pt+1 < p] defines a transaction cost
such that waiting is never optimal. For these costs to be calculated, the information set
of consumers needs to be defined. I assume consumers form expectations given current
prices and time, but they do not forecast the changes in number of seats remaining across
time. This seems reasonable given that remaining capacity is not reported to consumers.
With these assumptions, I find the median and mean transaction costs to be $2.14 and $2.20,
respectively. Recall that these costs are based on the most extreme case: the consumer who
is indifferent between purchasing today or delaying the decision.
Overall, these model results, along with the empirical evidence, suggest that the incen-
tive to wait to purchase is small. Although betting on price in airline markets may result
in gains, the trajectory of prices is overwhelmingly positive.
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